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Abstract
In 1994 Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which in
part gave the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJCRD) the power to
investigate local law enforcement agencies for Constitutional and civil rights violations.
Researchers have found these investigations are expensive, time consuming, and highly
intrusive to a law enforcement agency. To understand how these investigations are
impacting communities, data were gathered on cities with local law enforcement agencies
that have experienced an investigation by the DOJCRD. Using a quasi-experimental,
multiple time-series research design with a paired samples t-test, the dependent variables
(violent crime and arrest rates) were analyzed for any differences before and after the
introduction of the independent variable (the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation). With an established a = .05, adjusting for non-reported crime, and
comparing to a non-equivalent control variable (national crime rate), the research
findings indicate increased violent crime with the commencement of these investigations.
The results also show that arrest rates significantly decreased indicating the possibility of
de-policing. The negative impact to communities with increased violent crime rates and
decreased arrest rates calls into question the efficacy of DOJCRD investigations. By
supporting the recommendation for Congress to repeal this power given to the DOJCRD,
this research can lead to positive social change by preventing federal government
intrusion into local government that is negatively impacting communities.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Control and Law Enforcement Act
(VCCLEA), which in part granted the Department of Justice the authority to investigate
local law enforcement agencies for patterns and practice of Constitutional and civil rights
violations. This enabled the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJCRD) to
examine all facets of a local law enforcement agency to determine if there were systemic,
rather than isolated incidents of officers violating the Constitutional rights or civil rights
of the citizens they serve. This type of investigation is highly intrusive to a law
enforcement agency and can last months, and in some cases years. If the DOJCRD
investigation determines there are patterns and practices of Constitutional or civil rights
violations by a local law enforcement agency, they have the power to seek court
enforceable mandates against them. Mandates can create a monetary burden on an agency
and subject it to years of further oversight by the court. Although at first this seems like a
way to provide oversight of local law enforcement agencies to prevent aggressive or
rogue policing, there is evidence that this Congressional act is harming some
communities.
Analyses of a small sample of agencies that have undergone scrutiny by the
DOJCRD has indicated negative outcomes. Preliminary findings indicated soaring violent
crime rates and dramatically reduced arrest rates in the wake of these investigations. In
some cases, communities are under siege with the commencement of DOJCRD
investigations. In this study, I analyzed agencies that have come under the scrutiny of the
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DOJCRD for multiple alleged patterns and practice investigations. The positive social
change aspects of this research can lead to safer communities and could save lives.
Chapter 1 provides the background of the problem and then a deeper
understanding of the issues in the problem statement. By forming this basis, I will then
define the purpose of the study, moving into the research questions and hypothesis. After
some discussion of the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study, I
conclude the section with a look at the significance of the study and a final summary.
Background
The Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for 2016 indicates a
5.3% increase in violent crime in the United States from 2015 (Department of Justice,
2017). Some areas of the country; however, have seen greater increases. For instance,
Ferguson, Missouri experienced a 65% increase in violent crime between 2014 and 2015.
Chicago experienced a 58% increase in homicides between 2015 and 2016 (Peters, n.d.)
and in Baltimore, shootings increased by 72% between 2014 and 2015 (Bidgood, 2016).
These increases have prompted researchers to look for causation.
Ferguson, Chicago, and Baltimore have some similar attributes that have led
researchers to consider correlations among the cities. For instance, all three cities endured
an event involving local law enforcement officers that triggered civil unrest. Some have
speculated that because these events became highly publicized in the media, officers
might be pulling back from preventative enforcement and this is leading to increased
violent crime. This theory, coined the Ferguson effect, has been examined by several
researchers. Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe and Shjarback (2016) analyzed crime rates in large
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cities throughout the country to explain the uptick in the national crime rate. They
hypothesized the Ferguson effect was influencing all law enforcement and not just those
in Ferguson, Missouri. Using a sample of large cities across the country, they found no
correlation with Ferguson, Missouri or the national crime rate. Nix and Wolfe (2016)
considered what they called the role of managerial, organizational justice as an
influencing factor to the Ferguson effect. In their qualitative study, they analyzed
officers’ perceptions and attitudes in the Ferguson area. They found that officers were
willing to address community issues when they felt their agencies would support them.
The findings opened the door for the possibility that upper command decisions within a
law enforcement agency are causing de-policing, and responsible for the uptick in crime.
To date, there is only one study on the DOJCRD as an influence on violent crime
rates. Rushin and Edwards (2017) looked at how DOJCRD adjudicated mandates were
influencing crime rates in cities under scrutiny. They found increases in several crime
categories with the introduction of external regulation or mandates. However, as
mentioned earlier, investigations are lengthy and crime rates begin to increase long
before the influencing factors of mandates. For example, Chicago is experiencing
significant increases in violent crime rates since the onset of the DOJCRD investigation
and mandates have yet to be adjudicated or implemented as of this writing.
In my review, no study has been conducted on the effects of the commencement
of a DOJCRD investigation on local crime and arrest rates. There is not much dispute that
crime rates are significantly rising in areas where the DOJCRD has conducted a patterns
and practice of Constitutional or civil rights violations investigation. What did not appear
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in the literature is how the commencement of this investigation, rather than the applied
mandates, may be leading to substantial increases in crime and lower arrest rates in these
communities. If a correlation exists between the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation and crime rates that are leaving some communities vulnerable, a review of
this policy must follow. The importance of this not only affects the day-to-day suffering
of these cities, but it could save lives.
Problem Statement
After years of falling violent crime rates (Department of Justice, 2016), the FBI
has released its 2016 Preliminary Semiannual UCR, which indicates a 5.3% increase in
violent crime in the United States from 2015 (FBI, 2017). Some areas of the country are
experiencing greater increases in their crime rates. Ferguson, Missouri has experienced a
65% increase in violent crime in the last 2 years (Department of Justice, 2015). Chicago
went from 415 murders in 2014 to 478 in 2015 (Department of Justice, 2017), which
further increased by 58% in 2016 (Peters, n.d.). In Baltimore, there were 637 shootings in
2015, a 72% increase from 2014 (Bidgood, 2016). The common thread among these three
cities is that violent crime has significantly increased, and the local law enforcement
agencies are under scrutiny by the DOJCRD.
Acknowledging the increase in violent crime, Doyle Sam Dotson III, the Chief of
the St. Louis Police Department, theorized that officer “pull-back” might be the cause,
and he attributed this to what he called the “Ferguson effect” (Beyers, 2017). Under this
theory, officers are experiencing a polarizing effect due to media sensationalism and
subsequent manifestations surrounding encounters with African Americans. To test this
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theory, Wolf and Nix (2016) surveyed officers around Ferguson, Missouri. They
concluded that officers who have confidence in their authority or perceive their agency as
fair are more willing to partner with the community to solve problems, regardless of the
potential effects derived from negative publicity. Their findings unveil the possibility that
something other than officer fears may be responsible. If officers are “pulling back,” and
this is causing crime rates to increase, it could be that agency administrative decisions are
the cause. The DOJCRD has the power to establish court enforceable mandates on law
enforcement agencies, and this may be the impetus for administrators to direct their
efforts and resources to other, less provocative areas.
The objective of this research was to analyze secondary data sources for the
before and after effects on violent crime and arrest rates of all agencies that have come
under DOJCRD scrutiny since their inception in 1994. This is a quantitative, quasiexperimental, time-series design, with two continuous dependent variables (violent crime
rate and arrest rate) and one categorical independent variable measured before and after
the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation of a law enforcement agency. The
analysis also includes the use of a nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to analyze crime rates and arrest rates
before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation of a local law
enforcement agency. I sought to determine if the independent variable, the
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, has an impact on the dependent variables
violent crime rate and arrest rate. Preliminary analysis using data from Ferguson,
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Baltimore, and Chicago indicated significant changes were occurring to violent crime
rates and arrest rates, and the changes were negatively affecting the communities
involved.
The importance of law enforcement working within the guidelines of the
Constitution cannot be overstated. This research is not an attempt to endorse any position
regarding investigations conducted by the DOJCRD or the agency under scrutiny.
However, I recognize that a law enforcement agency’s primary purpose is to protect its
citizens. There are indications that when the DOJCRD commence their investigations,
crime rates increase to levels that put communities in danger. In Ferguson, Baltimore, and
Chicago, the DOJCRD left rising violent crime rates and dramatically reduced arrest
rates. If these three cities are representative of the whole, this calls into question the
efficacy of DOJCRD investigations. As stated earlier, in Chicago, mandates by the
DOJCRD have not yet been adjudicated or implemented, and the investigation alone has
led to increased violent crime rates and reduced arrest rates.
I analyzed the before and after effects on the dependent variables, violent crime
rates and arrest rates, with the introduction of the independent variable, DOJCRD
investigations into local law enforcement agencies. Increased violent crime rates and
decreased arrest rates were not the intention of Congress when they granted this authority
to the DOJCRD.
Theoretical Framework
The National Institute of Justice (2009) has identified several theories for crime
causation: routine activity theory, situational crime prevention theory, broken windows
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theory, crime opportunity theory, social disorganization theory, and crime pattern theory.
These theories establish why crime occurs in some places and not others. Of these
theories, I considered the routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory.
Both routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory include an
element of guardianship and help posit that the mere presence of a person deters
perpetrators of crime. The essence of this research supports the idea that internal policy
changes have led to law enforcement officers pulling back from otherwise high crime
areas, and this factor is contributing to increased violent crime rates. The question of
what triggered this phenomenon is the foundation of this study. The first step in this
process is to identify if a small sample is representative of the entire population of
agencies that have endured an overarching, multiple allegation, patterns and practice of
Constitutional and civil rights violations investigation by the DOJCRD.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
violent crime rates?
H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency.
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RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
arrest rates?
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a law enforcement agency.
Nature of Study
This quantitative study involved a quasi-experimental, multiple time-series,
nonequivalent control group design. I analyzed violent crime rates and arrest rates before
and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into local law enforcement
agencies. I analyzed changes to the dependent variables, violent crime rate and arrest rate,
after the introduction of the independent variable, the commencement of an investigation
by the DOJCRD on a local law enforcement agency. The analysis includes the use of a
nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate, during the same time periods that
each city has come under scrutiny of the DOJCRD. Multiple time-series was used to
determine violent crime rates, arrest rates, and the national crime rate before and after the
commencement a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
Definitions
The following are Part I crimes as defined by the FBI for UCR data and are
characterized as violent crimes. The data for this study includes only Part I offenses.
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Criminal homicide: Includes murder and nonnegligent manslaughter: the willful
(nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence,
attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, and accidental deaths are excluded. The
program classifies justifiable homicides separately and limits the definition to the killing
of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty or the killing of a felon, during
the commission of a felony, by a private citizen. Criminal homicide also refers to
manslaughter by negligence: the killing of another person through gross negligence.
Deaths of persons due to their own negligence, accidental deaths not resulting from gross
negligence, and traffic fatalities are not included in the category Manslaughter by
Negligence (FBI, 2017).
Forcible rape/legacy rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against
her will. Rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rape, regardless of the age of the
victim, are included. Statutory offenses (no force used—victim under age of consent) are
excluded (FBI, 2017).
Revised rape: Penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any
body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the
consent of the victim. Attempts or assaults to commit rape are also included; however,
statutory rape and incest are excluded. In December 2011, the UCR program changed its
definition of SRS rape to this revised definition. This change can be seen in the UCR data
starting in 2013. Any data reported under the older definition of rape will be called
“legacy rape.” (FBI, 2017).

10
Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care,
custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by
putting the victim in fear (FBI, 2017).
Aggravated assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for inflicting
severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use
of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or bodily harm. Simple assaults are
excluded (FBI, 2017).
Assumptions
I made the following assumptions for this research. First, I assumed the data from
the UCR was accurate. The FBI gathers data from approximately 18,000 law enforcement
agencies across the country. Despite rules and regulatory procedures for agencies
reporting to the UCR, there could be differences in how they report their data. My second
assumption was that the UCR has not made mistakes in reporting the data provided. To
reduce the threats to internal validity I limited the data to only Part I, violent crime
offenses. There is less ambiguity in the definitions of these crimes and agencies are more
likely to report this data accurately. I further address this issue by using a time-series
design and collecting data for 3 years before and after the introduction of the independent
variable. My third assumption was the use of quantitative, time-series methodology as the
appropriate design for this study. In this case, I used an interrupted time-series design
with a series of observations made before and after the introduction of the independent
variable. My fourth assumption was that the UCR accurately reports the national crime
rate, which I used to strengthen the design by using it as a nonequivalent control variable.
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My fifth and final assumption was that the DOJCRD reports the accurate date for the
commencement of their investigation in their investigation findings report.
Scope and Delimitations
This study includes all agencies that have come under scrutiny of the DOJCRD
for multiple allegations of patterns and practice of Constitutional and civil rights
violations. Other inquiries made by the DOJCRD are not as invasive. For instance, in
three cases the DOJCRD investigated how local organizations handled sexual assault
cases. To look at only one facet of an organization is not nearly as intrusive as an
overarching, multiple allegation, patterns, and practice investigation. This type of
investigation is highly intrusive, time consuming, and costly to the agency involved. This
study encompasses the entire population of agencies that fall under these criteria, thus
improving validity and generalizability.
Limitations
This study includes the entire population rather than a sample. By doing this, I
strengthen validity; however, because the study includes violent crime and arrest rates,
there may be confounding variables. I addressed this issue by looking at a specific point
in time and measuring before and after that point. Maxfield and Babbie (2011) argue that
validity issues are problematic with time-series designs unless they include a long series
of observations before and after the introduction of an independent variable. For this
study I used the commencement date provided by the DOJCRD and included data for 3
years before and 3 years after the introduction of the independent variable. I considered
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the year the investigation commenced as Year 1 after the introduction of the independent
variable.
I found UCR data to be mostly accurate and complete, but there were many
instances where it was not. Rather than to decrease sample size, I contacted several
agencies directly to gather all the data available. I found some agencies had all the data I
needed, others had crime data but not arrest data, and in some cases they were missing all
the data I was requesting. In some instances, I analyzed crime data on a city and not
arrest data because it was unavailable. If both the UCR and agency were missing years I
could not include them in the analysis. I provide a table in Chapter 4 outlining data issues
specific to all agencies under consideration.
Significance
If a correlation exists between the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation
into local law enforcement agency, increased violent crime rates, and reduced arrest rates,
this is not likely to be the intention of Congress when they empowered the DOJCRD in
1994. If these three communities (Ferguson, Chicago, Baltimore) are typical of the results
when local law enforcement agencies are under scrutiny by the DOJCRD, communities
are vulnerable to high violent crime rates. To date, there is no multiple time-series
research into the before and after effects on violent crime rates, and arrest rates, from the
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
This study could contribute to positive social change by unveiling a policy put in
place that may be contributing to substantially increased violent crime rates. If a
correlation exists between violent crime rates, arrest rates, and the DOJCRD investigating
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a local law enforcement agency, further research and a review of current policies must
follow. The primary responsibility of law enforcement, including the Department of
Justice, is the protection of its citizens. If policies are in place that undermines this
responsibility, positive social change would equate to the preservation of life.
Summary
Walden University’s commitment to positive social change includes the
evaluation of current public policies and their impact on society. I hypothesized that the
well-intentioned policy of DOJCRD investigations may be the impetus for increasing
violent crime rates and declining arrest rates in communities. By uncovering a correlation
between the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into local law enforcement
agencies and an increase in violent crime rates and decline in arrest rates, this research
can lead to improving the quality of life in these communities and could help save lives.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In response to the public outcry of perceived police brutality in 1994, Congress
granted the DOJCRD the authority to investigate state, county, and municipal law
enforcement agencies for patterns and practice of Constitutional or civil rights violations.
If substantiated, the DOJCRD can obtain court-ordered mandates to effect change within
those agencies. This policy is well-intentioned and holds law enforcement accountable to
the public they serve. However, an analysis of a small sample of agencies that have
withstood the lengthy and invasive nature of these investigations unveil a negative trend.
Upon the initiation of a formal investigation by the DOJCRD, violent crime rates increase
and arrest rates dramatically fall, leaving communities at risk. This has been somewhat
evident in Ferguson, Missouri, Chicago, Illinois, and Baltimore, Maryland. This study
was conducted to examine whether this small sample is representative of the entire
population of agencies subject to scrutiny by the DOJCRD.
Literature Search Strategy
There is little current research on correlations between violent crime and arrest
rates post DOJCRD investigations. Most research has been on the mandates placed on
law enforcement agencies and the effect they have had on the organization. The focus of
the research thus far includes changes within the agency and whether they have
implemented the mandates agreed to in the consent decree. The bulk of the research has
been an attempt to find causes for significant increases in certain areas of the country.
Theories such as the Ferguson effect and de-policing are at the forefront of the research.
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Although there is evidence to support these theories, there is no research that has
considered the effect of DOJCRD investigations on crime rates and arrest rates.
I used Walden University’s library database as well as criminal justice and
psychological search engines. I used ProQuest, EBSCO, and SAGE Journals but also
LexisNexis from both Walden University and University of California, Irvine. I found
Google Scholar helpful in some instances when I was searching for general ideas or
trying to find news articles not related to research. I used Cornell Law when I needed
specific definitions on law questions.
The bulk of my references are within the last 5 years. References beyond 5years
were necessary in many cases to provide historical information on important points,
policy, and law formation. Key search terms included Department of Justice, federal
oversight of law enforcement, 42 U.S.C §14141, consent decrees, federal mandates of
law enforcement agencies, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Judiciary
Committee, LAPD, Ferguson Effect, de-policing.
History of 42 U.S.C. § 14141
In 1991, a subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on
the Judiciary called a hearing to discuss the issue of police brutality. This was in response
to the public outcry stemming from the videotaped beating of Rodney King by Los
Angeles Police Department officers, publicized in the national media. The Federal
Government having statutory jurisdiction under Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241, Conspiracy
Against Rights, and Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of
Law, wanted to examine how widespread police misconduct is, not just in Los Angeles,
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but nationwide (FBI, n.d.; House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, 1991). The emphasis of the committee was to examine how
effective the Federal Government’s response is to police misconduct and to assess the
need for strengthening federal laws to address recalcitrant law enforcement agencies. At
that time, the Department of Justice and private citizens could do little to effect change in
a law enforcement agency because they did not possess the required statutory authority.
Congress rejected granting this authority in 1957, 1959, and again in 1964 with the
acclaimed Civil Rights Act. Congress considered this authority an inappropriate power
for the Department of Justice (House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, 1991). Two separate cases, the United States v. the City of
Philadelphia and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, were to test this lack of authority.
In the United States v. City of Philadelphia, 187 F.2d, (1980), the U.S.
government alleged that the city of Philadelphia and its police department engaged in a
patterns or practices of depriving persons of rights protected by the due process clause of
the 14th amendment. The District Court dismissed the suit, finding that the attorney
general had no authority to bring a lawsuit to advance the civil rights of a third person.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reviewed the case and agreed with the findings
of the District Court (The United States v. City of Philadelphia, 187 F.2d, 1980). This
decision would summarily remove any possibility of federal government intervention in a
law enforcement agency while lacking statutory authority.
In the City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 461 U.S. 95 (1983) case, Adolph Lyons
sought damages against officers from the LAPD for injuries sustained from the use of a
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chokehold. Lyons alleged that the officers applied the chokehold despite Lyons offering
no resistance to an illegal arrest. The chokehold rendered Lyons unconscious and
damaged his larynx. Lyons also sought an injunction against the city of Los Angeles
barring any future use of chokeholds. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California ultimately entered a preliminary injunction against the use of chokeholds
except in circumstances where there was a threat of death or serious bodily injury. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision
of the lower court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately disagreed
with the lower courts. They found federal courts on behalf of private citizens were
without jurisdiction to entertain claims for injunctive relief. Although Lyons may have a
claim for damages based on injury, absent a real and immediate threat of officers
targeting him in the future, injunctive relief was not possible (City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 1983).
Based on the testimony before the House Subcommittee on police brutality, the
Judiciary Committee created the Police Accountability Act of 1991, granting authority to
the Department of Justice to pursue patterns and practice cases against recalcitrant law
enforcement agencies. Congress again voted against giving the Department of Justice this
power. However, in 1994 Congress enacted the VCCLEA and the only part of the Police
Accountability Act of 1991 not included in the VCCLEA was a private citizen’s right to
pursue injunctive relief for police malfeasance.
Title XXI of the VCCLEA, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (Section 14141; re-codified at 34
U.S.C. § 12601) authorized the U.S. attorney general to investigate and litigate cases
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involving law enforcement agencies for patterns or practices of Constitutional or civil
rights violations (Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). Under this
provision, the DOJCRD could obtain court-ordered mandates in the form of consent
decrees on state and local law enforcement agencies to address institutional pattern and
practice failures causing systemic police misconduct. Isolated instances are not enough to
establish a pattern or practice of institutional failures; investigation findings must unveil
systemic violations of peoples’ rights. Typically, investigations include the use of
excessive force; unlawful stops, searches, or arrests; and discriminatory policing. Other
considerations include bias based on race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, and sexual
orientation. The DOJCRD established the Special Litigation Section in 1995 to enforce
the police misconduct provision of the VCCLEA.
Investigations Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141
The first case brought under U.S.C. § 14141 was in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania in
1997. Since then, the DOJCRD has opened 69 formal investigations that led to 40 court
ordered, mandated reform agreements or consent decrees (Civil Rights Division U.S.
Department of Justice, 2017). Decisions to initiate an investigation into a law
enforcement agency begin with preliminary inquiries stemming from complaints made by
community members, advocacy groups, attorneys, judges, legislators, police officers,
other law enforcement agencies, or local government officials. Although preliminary
inquiries are confidential, they are extensive and can involve research into nearly any
aspect of a law enforcement agency. Pending the results of the preliminary inquiry, the
DOJCRD can decide to take no further action or consider other forms of intervention
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such as providing guidance to effective community policing operations. If the inquiry
points toward a more significant problem, the DOJCRD director can decide to allocate
the resources toward a formal investigation of the agency. The decision to pursue an
official investigation includes the high cost associated with the project. In 2000 the
Department of Justice requested an additional $100 million in funding to increase the
number of investigations allowed (Budget Staff Justice Management Division, 1999).
Rushin (2014) estimated the Department of Justice averaged three investigations per year
since the inception of U.S.C. § 14141. If the director decides to move forward with the
investigation, the DOJCRD notifies the jurisdiction’s chief executive officer and chief
legal officer in advance of a public announcement.
Formal investigations of law enforcement agencies are extensive and highly
intrusive to the organization under investigation. Investigators review hundreds and
sometimes thousands of pages of internal documents, reports, officer training, and
personnel files (Rushin, 2014). Although the length of investigations varies, many will
take over a year to complete. For instance, the investigation into the Chicago Police
Department began on December 7, 2015 and concluded January 13, 2017 (United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division & United States Attorney’s Office, 2017).
From the perspective of the DOJCRD, police leaders set the tone for the law
enforcement agency’s approach to an investigation, particularly in the early stages (Civil
Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). Because of this, they begin by
gathering perspectives from rank and file officers and interact with representatives of
police labor organizations and affinity groups such as the Black, Latino, female, and
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LGBTQ officer associations. They explain the purpose and general structure of the
planned investigation and answer questions that arise. There is no established timetable to
completion, and there is no set agenda as to what they will review next. These
investigations are costly and disruptive, and are likely to have a profound effect on any
agency, especially a small organization like the Ferguson Police Department.
The investigation of the Ferguson Police Department began September of 2014
and concluded March 4, 2015. According to the investigation findings, investigators
interviewed all top-ranking officials from the City of Ferguson, municipal court judges
and clerks, and half of the sworn officers from the Ferguson Police Department. They
participated in ride-a-longs with officers, reviewed over 35,000 pages of police records,
and thousands of emails and other electronic materials. Using statistical experts, they
analyzed officer stops, searches, citations, arrests, and data collected by the municipal
court. They met with 10 neighborhood associations, community groups, and advocacy
organizations and conducted both in-person and telephone interviews from people that
reside in Ferguson or who had interactions with the Ferguson Police Department (United
States Department of Justice Civil Right Division, Investigation of Ferguson Police
Department, 2015). This did not include any preliminary work they completed or the ongoing monitoring resulting from the investigation.
Upon completion of an investigation, the DOJCRD notifies the agency of the
findings and whether they have found sufficient evidence to support a finding of a pattern
or practice of conduct in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Of the 69
investigations conducted by the DOJCRD since the enactment of U.S.C. § 14141, 26
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resulted in no further action required. The others resulted in recommendations for some
form of intervention, up to and including court mandated consent decrees (Civil Rights
Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017).
Consent Decrees Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141
Consent decrees are an order of a court based on an agreement made between
parties in a lawsuit. They are subject to approval by the court and cannot be appealed
except in instances of fraud (Legal Information Institute, n.d.). Consent decrees are
preferable in most cases to avoid the publicity and potential damaging exposure from a
lengthy court trial. Some critics of consent decrees argue that federal courts assert too
much power on defendants and contend they impose conditions on local and state
government that usurp state power (Farlex, n.d.). Typically, the DOJCRD petitions the
federal court to order the department to end the misconduct and change policies and
procedures that have contributed to the misconduct. From these petitions, negotiations
commence between the DOJCRD and the law enforcement agency that lead to consent
decrees, which place mandates on agencies to effect change. The federal court then
reviews the consent decree, and if accepted, will order the terms of the consent decree. In
most cases, law enforcement agencies have a time frame to complete the changes, and
some form of monitoring is ordered that will update the court on the agencies progress.
Consent decrees can vary in length but will typically be in place for 5 years or longer
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017, p. 748). Consent decrees affect many aspects and operations
of a law enforcement agency as evidenced in the City of Ferguson mandated decree.
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The consent decree for the City of Ferguson addresses community policing and
engagement, reform of the municipal code, policies and training, bias-free police and
court practices, voluntary contacts, stops, searches, citations, and arrest assessment and
improvement, first amendment protected activity assessment and improvement, crisis
intervention, school resource officer program, body-worn and in-car camera program,
supervision assessment and improvement, officer assistance and support assessment and
improvement, recruitment assessment and improvement, performance evaluations and
promotions assessment and improvement, supplemental recruit and in-service training
programs, municipal court reform, accountability assessment and improvement, civilian
oversight, data collection, reporting and transparency, monitoring, compliance
assessment and enforcement of the consent decree. The decree affects nearly every
operation of the Ferguson Police Department and will not terminate until the city has
been in full and active compliance for 2 years. Remarkably, crime rates, arrest rates and
public safety are not a consideration of the investigation or mandated consent decree
(United States of America v. The City of Ferguson, 2016).
Correlation with Violent Crime Rates
Investigations of police agencies by the DOJCRD and subsequent consent
decrees, if mandated, are intrusive and disruptive to the normal operations of a police
agency. This may be having a significant impact on violent crime rates in those
communities. After decades of falling violent crime rates (Department of Justice, 2016),
FBI statistics indicate the violent crime rate increased by 3.4% nationwide in 2016 when
compared to 2015, the most significant single-year increase in 25 years. The nationwide
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homicide rate increased by 7.9%, for a total increase of more than 20% since 2014 (FBI,
2017). Some areas of the country are experiencing even greater increases in their crime
rates. Ferguson, Missouri has experienced a 65% increase in violent crime in the last 2
years (Department of Justice, 2015). Chicago went from 415 murders in 2014 to 478 in
2015 (Department of Justice, 2017) and further increased by 58% in 2016 (Peters, n.d.).
In Baltimore, there were 637 shootings in 2015, a 72% increase from 2014 (Bidgood,
2016). The common thread among these three cities is that violent crime has significantly
increased, and the local law enforcement agency is under scrutiny by the DOJCRD
(United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015, 2016; United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division & United States Attorney’s Office, 2017).
The DOJCRD investigation of Ferguson Police Department began in September
2014 and culminated with a consent decree filed in March of 2016. In 2014 the violent
crime rate in Ferguson per 100,000 inhabitants was 291.6 and increased to 505.7 in 2015
(Department of Justice, 2015). In May 2015, the DOJCRD opened its investigation into
Baltimore Police Department, which culminated in a consent decree filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland on January 12, 2017 (United States of America
v. Police Department of Baltimore, 2017; Department of Justice, n.d.). During this time,
shootings in Baltimore increased by 72% (Bidgood, 2016).
At of the time of this writing, the DOJCRD has not adjudicated mandates on the
Chicago Police Department despite the investigation’s review of the department. This is
an important point toward this study because the findings of the investigation conducted
by the DOJCRD found officer morale “profoundly” low (United States Department of
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Justice Civil Rights Division & United States Attorney’s Office, 2017). The investigation
commenced in December of 2015, and in 2016 there were 762 homicides, nearly 300
more than 2015. There were also 1,100 more shootings in 2016 compared to 2015
(Department of Justice, 2017). The findings of the investigation did not consider any
correlation between the onset of the investigation and the significant increase in violent
crime. They instead looked to the Chicago Police Department to address the mistrust the
community has in them to affect the soaring violent crime rates (United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, & United States Attorney’s Office Northern
District of Illinois, 2017). This may be true in Chicago, but the phenomenon is clearly
prevalent in more than just one city.
In 2016 the Department of Justice, responding to rising violent crime rates,
commissioned Dr. Richard Rosenfeld, Professor at the University of Missouri, to
examine the increase in homicides from 2015. Rosenfeld (2016) considered the emerging
theories of the Ferguson effect, de-policing, and increased heroin usage as causative
factors. He concluded increased heroin usage as the primary cause for the phenomenon,
while deemphasizing the impact of the Ferguson effect and de-policing. There was no
consideration given to the DOJCRD investigations, and of greater importance, Rosenfeld
concluded that if the Ferguson effect or de-policing is the cause for the uptick in
homicides, then we should also observe significant reductions in arrests (Rosenfeld,
2016). Uptick in crime and significant reductions in arrests are precisely what is
happening in Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago.
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Ferguson Effect
Doyle Sam Dotson III, the Chief of the St. Louis Police Department, theorized
that officer “pull-back” might be the cause of the increase in crime rates and attributed
this to what he coined the “Ferguson effect” (Beyers, 2017). Under this theory, officers
are experiencing a polarizing effect due to media sensationalism and subsequent
manifestations surrounding encounters with African Americans. The impetus for this was
when Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson shot and killed an unarmed African
American wanted for robbery named Michael Brown. During the arrest, Brown began
beating on the officer and attempted to take his gun. Upon reviewing the case, a Grand
Jury declined to indict Officer Wilson, and this led to civil discourse and rioting in the
predominantly African American community. Officer Wilson wanted to return to the
Ferguson police department, and despite his vindication in the shooting, the department
and the city considered him too great of a liability and forced him to resign. Due to
continual harassment by the media and death threats made to his family, very few people
know where he lives with his wife and daughter (Yan, 2015). The finding of justified use
of force in this case forever altered the lives of the officer and his family.
Baltimore also had an officer-involved incident that led to civil discourse in a
predominantly African American community. In 2015, six officers were subject to arrest
when a 25-year-old African American named Freddie Gray died while in police custody.
Charges on the officers ranged from second degree depraved-heart murder to illegal
arrest. All the officers pled not-guilty, and four of them went to trial. One trial ended in a
mistrial, and three others were found not guilty. Prosecutors fearing the same resolve on
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the remaining cases dismissed all the charges on the remaining officers. Marilyn Mosby,
States Attorney for Baltimore, faced considerable criticism for pursuing charges that
many considered baseless. Several officers involved have filed civil litigation against
Mosby for malicious prosecution. This encounter severely affected the lives of these
officers and their families for a considerable amount of time and has continued well into
2017.
Officers, fearing these types of scenarios, are what some theorize is leading to
officer pull-back from proactive policing, or what is coined the Ferguson effect.
However, Wolfe and Nix (2016) studied the Ferguson effect phenomenon by
interviewing officers from around the Ferguson, Missouri area. Officers reported that
regardless of any effects they may endure from negative publicity, if they felt their
agency was fair, and they had confidence in their authority, they were willing to work
with communities to solve problems. This signals something other than officers’ fears
being attributable to the Ferguson effect and increased violent crime rates.
Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe and Shjarback (2016) looked at correlations between the
Ferguson effect and pre-and post-crime rates in “large” cities throughout the country.
Researchers hypothesized the so-called Ferguson effect did have a chilling effect on law
enforcement officers, and this led to crime rate increases in large cities throughout the
country. Researchers were unable to substantiate the hypothesis finding no correlation
between crime rates and the so-called Ferguson effect. This study focused on large cities
throughout the country and did not look specifically at cities with local law enforcement
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agencies under DOJCRD investigation. Again, signaling something other than the socalled Ferguson effect could be responsible for the increase in violent crime rates.
De-policing
De-policing is a theory that posits officers are deliberately ignoring crimes and
withdrawing from crime prevention services due to fear of accusations of racial profiling.
Rushin and Edwards (2017) considered de-policing in their study of agencies subject to
consent decrees under U.S.C. § 14141. Using a difference-in-differences estimation
strategy they analyzed the crime rates of 61 cities the DOJ has investigated since 1994
and compared them to the 31 agencies that ultimately came under a consent decree. The
focus of this study analyzed the effect of the consent decree on crime rates. They found
statistically insignificant increases in all index crimes with the introduction of public
scrutiny on local law enforcement agencies and statistically significant increases in
several crime categories with the introduction of external regulation from a consent
decree. Although they are testing for the effect on crime rates, their treatment and control
groups came from the same population of agencies that were subject to DOJCRD
investigation (Rushin and Edwards, 2017 p. 721).
The timing and effect on violent crime rates in Baltimore, Ferguson, and Chicago
when compared to the national crime rate suggest a substantial increase in violent crime
with the onset of a DOJCRD investigation. This surge in violent crime cannot be entirely
attributable to the consent decree as argued in Rushin and Edwards (2017) because as of
now, Chicago is not under a consent decree and crime rates are soaring. Crime rates also
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began to increase in Baltimore and Ferguson long before the implementation of their
consent decrees.
This same theory holds true when applied to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, the first
investigation completed by the DOJCRD. The investigation commenced in April of 1996,
concluded in January 1997 and the city entered a consent decree with the DOJCRD in
April 1997. The violent crime rate went from 427.32 in 1995 to 480.30 in 1996 (The
Disaster Center, 2016). Again, violent crime rates began to increase at the
commencement of the investigation, long before external regulation from a consent
decree.
If de-policing is the cause it would manifest itself in other ways besides crime rate
increases. Cantora, Lyer, and Restivo (2016) using a qualitative designed study,
examined crime in East Baltimore and concluded that people lacked collective efficacy to
address several issues in their communities. Specific to law enforcement they found the
slow and ineffective response to calls for service leading citizens to believe they [law
enforcement] didn’t care. This again signals the possibility of de-policing resulting in an
increase in violent crime rates. If officers are not proactively working, commanders
should recognize this and adjust, unless executive policy changes are the cause of the
pull-back. CompStat and the Chicago Police Department may unveil this possibility.
CompStat and the Chicago Police Department
As police resources become scarcer, the need to effectively place valuable
resources toward problematic areas has become critical. In 1994, New York Police
Department adopted a program called CompStat (Bronstein, 2014). Willis (2011) found

29
the use of CompStat and community policing as the two most visible reforms of law
enforcement to occur in the last quarter century. This strategic control system gathers and
disseminates information on crime problems within communities and provides tracking
information to commanders of efforts made to address the issues. The intention behind
adopting this program is to develop a method for allocating police resources efficiently.
This data-driven system maps crime statistics, analyzes the data, and provides real-time
information to agency decision makers on where best to place law enforcement resources.
Commanders are responsible for the implementation of resources and other programs to
address crime in their areas and are required to meet regularly with colleagues and
superiors to defend their command decisions. Commanders that fail to address crime in
their areas are subject to discipline, up to and including demotion (Bronstein, 2014;
Bratton, Malinowski, 2008; Moore, 2003; Moore, Braga, 2003; Weisburd, Mastrofski,
McNally, Greenspan, and Willis, 2003).
Numerous agencies across the country are using CompStat or some other similar
quantifiable system to make informed decisions about resource allocation. Chicago
Police Department was using the CompStat system but discontinued its use at
approximately the same time as the DOJCRD investigation. Garry McCarthy, the former
police superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, who was fired by the Mayor of
Chicago in December of 2016, told the Daily News that among the reasons for the spike
in violent crime in Chicago was the department no longer holds CompStat meetings to
focus on crime hot spots, and police stops are down nearly 90% from 2015 (Blau, 2016).
This again signals something other than officer fears attributing to the increase in crime
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rates. This opens the door for the possibility of upper-level managers and administrators
setting policy to address the DOJCRD accusations, instead of attending to crime rates and
the effect on the public they serve. Missouri had similar results for police stops with
100,000 fewer stops between 2014 and 2015 the time when Ferguson Police Department
was under investigation by the DOJCRD (Shjarback, Decker, Wolfe & Pyrooz, 2017).
Baltimore also experienced a reduction in arrests and a spike in crime since the inception
of their DOJCRD investigation, (Dewan, 2017). Further evidence of de-policing and the
theoretical possibility that DOJCRD investigations are leading to soaring crime rates.
This calls into question the efficacy of DOJCRD investigations on local law enforcement
agencies.
Efficacy of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division
In March of 2017, Attorney General Sessions called for a review of all consent
decrees signaling an intention to withdraw from police department investigations by the
DOJCRD. Rushin (2014) found Department of Justice internal policy changes either
discouraging or encouraging federal involvement in local agencies ebb and flows with the
current administration philosophies. This finding sets the stage for inconsistent and
selective enforcement of U.S.C. § 14141 by the top law enforcement official in the
country who is investigating law enforcement agencies for among other things,
inconsistent and selective enforcement of the people in their jurisdictions.
Federal bureaucracy often comes with an exorbitant price tag. The Washington
Post found the reform agreement in Los Angeles estimated cost at $300 million. Detroit
projected costs at $50 million, and Puerto Rico at $200 million despite both these cities
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being in extreme financial hardship. These figures don’t include costs associated with the
investigations by the DOJCRD that run into the tens of hundreds of millions. In many
cases, the salaries and expenses of the federal monitors and their staff after the
investigations are among the most significant costs. Some even believe monitors have a
financial incentive to prolong the oversight (Kelly, Childress, & Rich, 2015). With this
responsibility in the hands of bureaucrats with huge budgets forcing law enforcement
agencies to spend huge amounts of money to implement changes, the public should
expect the outcome to be excellent.
In 2013 the Police Executive Research Forum assessed the DOJCRD and noted
some of the challenges of reform, prompting calls for re-examining some aspects of their
work. Although the Forum did not state what this meant, they did acknowledge agencies
have improved policies on critical issues such as the use of force, better training of
officers, and more advanced information systems in the wake of DOJCRD investigations
and subsequent consent decrees (Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice, 2017).
The LAPD investigation and subsequent consent decree provide us with a detailed
analysis of the entire process.
Within a month of the videotaped beating of Rodney King by LAPD officers,
public outcry caused the Mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, to impanel the
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, informally known as
the Christopher Commission. The Christopher Commission examined problems with
excessive force, racism and bias, community policing, recruitment, training, promotion,
assignment, and other personnel issues, personnel complaints and officer discipline in the
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LAPD. Among the many problems unveiled by the Commission were that racism and
bias within the LAPD aggravated the problem of excessive force leading to incidents like
the Rodney King beating (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police
Department, 1991, p. xll). The findings prompted the LAPD to make changes to address
the issues found by the Christopher Commission. 5 years later, LAPD convened a study
to examine the extent to which they had addressed the recommendations of the
Christopher Commission. The results indicated significant progress in some areas but
lacking in other areas such as management accountability (Los Angeles Police Dept.,
1996).
Despite the impetus for the 1991 police brutality hearings by the Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights being the public outcry from the LAPD Rodney King
beatings, it would take until 1996 before the DOJCRD began a preliminary investigation
of the LAPD. For unknown reasons the investigation didn’t progress to a conclusion until
May of 2000 when the DOJCRD announced they had enough evidence to file a patterns
and practice suit against the LAPD (Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2000).
The announcement came after officer Rafael Perez unveiled illegal conduct by
approximately 70 officers in the Rampart Division of LAPD in 1999. Allegations
included shootings, beatings, framing and perjury by officers and led to the dismissal of
over a hundred criminal cases and nearly 90 million dollars paid to settle civil suits
(Stone, Foglesong, & Cole, 2009, p. 4). For three years before the unveiling of this
scandal, the DOJCRD was investigating the LAPD. Other than acknowledging the efforts
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of the LAPD and the Police Commission for uncovering the misconduct, the DOJCRD
had no part in unveiling this scandal.
In 2009, at the request of Chief William Bratton of the Los Angeles Police
Department, Harvard Kennedy School completed a study funded by the Los Angeles
Police Foundation, on the change that has occurred in the LAPD under a consent decree
(Stone et al., 2009, p. 2). Researchers from Harvard Kennedy school concluded, “we see
a staggering scale of change” and that it is unlikely that a consent decree can ever make
improvements without strong and effective police leadership. (Stone et al., 2009, p. 68)
Among many other assertions made in the study, they considered “de-policing” as a
possibility given the restraints put on officers with the implementation of the consent
decree. The study found that in every instance where the Department of Justice entered a
consent decree with a state or local government to address an alleged patterns and
practice of police misconduct, concerns were raised about de-policing (Stone et al., 2009,
p. 19). Through interviews and focus groups with officers, they found many officers
insisting that the consent decree remained an impediment to effective policing and a
deterrent to the work necessary to reduce crime in communities (Stone et al., 2009, p.19).
This echoed a study conducted by LAPD in 2003 showing 79% of officers believed the
consent decree impeded their ability to reduce crime, 89% agreed that because of fear of
being unfairly disciplined, officers are not being proactive, and 93% agreed that the threat
of community complaints prevents them from being proactive (Stone et al., 2009, p.19).
These findings are closely related to an LAPD study completed in 1999, before the
implementation of a consent decree. In that study, 15% of officers felt the disciplinary
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system was fair and 79% of officers were afraid of being punished for making an honest
mistake. The Harvard Kennedy study concluded that distrust in the departments’
accountability system may have diminished during the period of the consent decree rather
than increase. What we don’t know however, is if the distrust levels are just returning to
normal because they are only comparing to data from the 1999 study which is 3 years
into the DOJCRD’s investigation (Stone et al., 2009, p. 21).
Despite officers expressing feelings of timidity and fear while engaging certain
segments of the community, Harvard Kennedy researchers concluded; “the statistics
refute any claim of de-policing in Los Angeles today as a result of the consent decree.”
(Stone, Foglesong & Cole, 2009, p. 30). However, on page three of the study, the report
states, “In the first years, when the Department was led by officials who failed to
implement the decree, perhaps because they had resisted and resented it from the start,
crime in Los Angeles increased” (Stone et al., 2009, p. 30). This finding was echoed in a
Department of Justice report in 2017 (Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice,
2017).
The Civil Rights Division report from the Department of Justice in 2017
acknowledges this increase in crime in Los Angeles also dismissing it because agency
officials were not embracing the spirit of the consent decree. In the entire Department of
Justice report of 2017, this one instance is the only time where crime rates and depolicing are mentioned in assessing their efficacy. The report does state the Division
typically tracks data such as the rate of stops, searches, and arrests; including the
location, the subject’s race, ethnicity, gender, and age, but it makes no mention of
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monitoring overall effect on crime or arrest rates in communities under investigation by
the DOJCRD. Without reviewing all cities under DOJCRD scrutiny, we cannot conclude
if the results in Los Angeles are an accurate representation of the outcome of DOJCRD
investigations.
Alpert, McLean, and Wolfe (2017) considered DOJCRD investigations and
consent decrees and the effect they had on police accountability and reform. They found
that when it comes to issues of evaluation and sustainability not only is there no measure
of compliance or sustainability, but once monitors leave, there is no requirement to
maintain any features of the consent decree. They further conclude there is no convincing
evidence of long-term improvements in agencies under consent decrees. This report
focuses on the consent decree and how it has impacted the law enforcement agency and
questions the sustainability of the DOJCRD mandates. There is no discussion about crime
rates, arrest rates or the impact to the community.
If communities are experiencing dramatic increases in their violent crime rate and
equally dramatic decreases in arrest rates when the DOJCRD initiates their investigation,
this is going to have a significant impact on communities. De-policing may be the cause
for this, but we must first look at all investigations by the DOJCRD rather than just a
small sample. If officers are no longer engaging in preventative work, this may explain
the substantial increase in violent crime rates based on routine activity and situational
crime prevention theory.
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Theoretical Basis
There are numerous theories for crime that date back to when crime was first
documented. 18th century Europe considered crime in more individual terms, often
blaming the power of Satan over a person as causation. Positivism theories deemed
societal influences are leading to human behavior and similarly, biological approaches
analyzed nutrition, diet, and physical attributes as contributory to criminal behavior. In
the 19th century, Cesare Lombroso considered criminals as atavists, born to be criminals
and attempted to relate certain physical characteristics such as facial features to criminal
psychopathology (Sabbatini, 1997). Phycological theories try to explain crime as a
sickness, from psychological abnormalities, psychopathic personalities or mental illness.
There is certainly no evidence to suggest that any one of these theories explains crime
causation any more than another.
The National Institute of Justice (2009) has identified the following theories of
crime causation: routine activity theory, situational crime prevention theory, broken
windows theory, crime opportunity theory, social disorganization theory, and crime
pattern theory. These theories establish why crime occurs in some areas and not others.
Both routine activity theory and situational crime prevention theory include an element of
guardianship and help posit that the mere presence of a person deters perpetrators of
crime (Clarke, 1980).
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) seminal work on routine activities theory introduced a
model that attempted to explain why crime occurs. The key ideas of routine activities
theory posit the commission of a crime requires not only the existence of a motivated
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offender, but also the availability of a suitable target and the absence of a capable
guardian. Hollis, Felson, & Welsh (2013) argue the concept of guardianship has evolved
and been redefined to a guardian keeps eye on the potential target of crime. “Someone is
watching and could detect untoward behaviors that deters the likely offender from
committing a criminal act.” (Hollis, Felson & Welsh, 2013, p. 71)
Skeptical of singular techniques for controlling situational precipitators of crime,
Wortly (2001) argues that reducing deindividuation also contributes to crime prevention
and emphasizes the importance of intervention methods at the point which he claims
comes before routine activities and situational crime opportunity theories. He does
conclude however that controlling situational precipitators of crime and reducing
opportunities for crime should not be understood as competing prevention approaches to
deindividuation (Wortley, 2001, p. 28).
Clarke (2012) looks back to 1998 when he asserted that opportunity makes a thief
and assessed transformations in crime fighting perceptions that have occurred since that
time. His findings led to much bolder claims about the role of opportunity in crime.
Among the claims by Clarke is, “the more opportunities for crime that exist, the more
crime there will be” (Clarke, 2012, p. 6).
These theories present the possibility that if de-policing is occurring and law
enforcement officers are pulling back from otherwise high crime areas, this factor may be
contributing to increased violent crime rates. Sir Robert Peel regarded as the father of
modern British policing produced the nine “Principles of Law Enforcement of 1829.”
The ninth principle states, “The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and
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disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them”. Although
situational crime prevention and routine activities theories include an element of
guardianship, this doesn’t necessarily mean only police; security guards, video cameras,
and just simply someone being home could also qualify for guardianship. The police
however, are the most visible manifestation of power and authority in society.
Summary and Conclusion
Crime rates in Pittsburg, Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago increased at the same
time the DOJCRD began their investigation. Researchers have attempted to explain this
phenomenon with various theories such as the Ferguson effect, de-policing, and increased
heroin usage. Rushin and Edwards (2017) found statistically significant results in
increased crime rates when the DOJCRD consent decrees went into effect. However, in a
small sample of three cities, (Pittsburg, Ferguson, and Baltimore) consent decrees were
not adjudicated for at least a year after the DOJCRD investigation began yet crime rates
increased, and arrest rates fell well before then. In Chicago, despite the DOJCRD’s
scathing review of the Chicago Police Department, no consent decree is in place, and yet
the crime rate is soaring, and officer productivity is falling.
For the communities of Pittsburg, Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago, they have
endured increased violent crime from the time the DOJCRD announced they were going
to investigate their local police department. This might be coincidence and justifies why
it is necessary to examine the violent crime and arrest rates of all cities the DOJCRD has
investigated. First and foremost, local law enforcement and the Department of Justice has
a duty to protect communities and assist in making them safe. No study has considered
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what happens to violent crime and arrest rates when the DOJCRD begin their
investigation, but there are indicators that sound the alarm of concern.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The goal of this study was to analyze data from agencies that have come under
scrutiny by the DOJCRD and any effect this had on their violent crime rates and arrest
rates. The hypothesis considers the commencement of an investigation conducted by the
DOJCRD into a local law enforcement agency as the impetus for increasing violent crime
rates and falling arrest rates.
In this section I begin by restating the research questions and hypothesis. I then
provide the research design and rationale I used to answer the research questions. My
methodology section will follow where I will define the population and data that were
analyzed. I will then provide the statistical analysis I used with SPSS and the assumptions
for proper analysis. I conclude with a discussion of the threats to validity and summary of
the research method.
Research Question’s and Hypothesis
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
violent crime rates?
H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency.
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RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
arrest rates?
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a law enforcement agency.
Research Design and Rationale
For the study I used a quantitative, quasi-experimental, multiple time-series
research design. This design was selected because it allowed me to study a phenomenon
that cannot be controlled or is unethical to be controlled (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Quasi-experimental designs are distinguished from experimental designs primarily
because they lack random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups
(Babbie, 2017). This research involved all agencies that have come under the scrutiny of
the DOJCRD, so random assignment was not needed. This study also included the
national crime rate as a nonequivalent control group. I chose this type of control group
because the national crime rate differs significantly from the experimental groups (i.e.,
local violent crime rate and local arrest rate; Babbie, 2017). Using existing data, I
analyzed violent crime rates and arrest rates as the dependent variables and any
correlation they had with the independent variable, the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation. I analyzed the nonequivalent control variable, national crime rate, during
the same time frame that each agency came under the scrutiny of the DOJCRD. The time
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series includes 3 years before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation
as identified in the investigation findings.
Methodology
Population
The population for this study includes all agencies that have come under
DOJCRD scrutiny for multiple alleged patterns and practice of Constitutional or civil
rights violations. Because the entire population is well defined and manageable in size, I
was able to use the entire population, which will go toward generalizability and eliminate
sampling bias threats.
The DOJCRD posited that the number of investigations they have completed
since their inception in 1994 is 69. However, not all DOJCRD investigations are as
intrusive to an agency. For instance, the DOJCRD investigated the Missoula Police
Department, the University of Montana Police Department, and the Missoula County
Attorney’s Office for failing to properly investigate and prosecute sexual assault cases.
These investigations are not nearly as intrusive as an overarching investigation that looks
at all facets of a law enforcement agency. There is a difference between the number the
DOJCRD posits as investigations they have completed and those included in this study.
In some instances, the DOJCRD investigated state patrols or county sheriff departments.
Because I looked at violent crime rates specifically in cities, these agencies were not
included in my assessment. I provide a table in Chapter 4 detailing decisions made for
each agency.
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Data
For the study I used data from the FBI, Uniform Crime Rate (UCR). The UCR
collects statistics from law enforcement agencies, compiles the information, and reports
the findings. I gathered data for 3 years before and after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation. The date the investigation commenced is available in the
findings report and made public by the DOJCRD. I considered the year of
commencement of the investigation and the subsequent 2 years as part of the “after”
analysis, and the preceding 3 years in the “before” analysis. The analysis considered the
before and after effects on violent crime rates and arrest rates using the national crime
rate, provided by the UCR, as a nonequivalent control variable.
The data included Part I, violent crime offense rates, arrest rates, and the national
crime rate. Part I, violent crime offenses include; murder and nonnegligent homicide,
rape (legacy and revised), robbery, and aggravated assault. (See definitions in Chapter 1
on how each crime is defined by the UCR) The violent crime rate was calculated by
dividing the number of reported violent crimes by the total population of the city under
analysis and then multiplying the result by 100,000.
RVC ÷ TP * 100,000 = Violent Crime Arrest Rate
RVC = Reported Violent Crime, TP = Total Population
Arrest rates include all reported arrests made by an agency in the time frame under
consideration. The purpose of using all arrests is to tease out the possibility of depolicing. The arrest rate was calculated by dividing the number of reported arrests by the
population of the city under scrutiny. The result is then multiplied by 100,000.
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RA ÷ TP * 100,000 = Arrest Rate
RA = Reported Arrests, TP = Total Population
Statistical Analysis and Assumptions
Using SPSS, I used a paired sample t-test to determine the mean difference between
paired observations. This within-subjects design can analyze a continuous dependent
variable, with one categorical independent variable on two levels, before and after an
event. Despite the low sample size for each city, n = 3, Winter (2013) found the paired
sample t-test can be applied with n’s as low as two when effect size is expected to be
large. This assertion held true even in circumstances where combinations of unequal
variance and sample size were present (Winter, 2013) For this study, three separate tests
were run to determine relationships between the dependent variables, i.e., violent crime
rate, arrest rate, and national crime rate, and the independent variable, the commencement
of a DOJCRD investigation. The calculation included a point estimate and confidence
interval of the mean difference between the two related groups, the statistical significance
of the difference, and a measure of the effect size. The necessary assumptions for this
analysis included:
1) Dependent variables measured at the continuous level. Violent crime rate and
arrest rate are all measured at the continuous level and are the dependent
variables. I used a nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate, for
comparison which is also measured at the continuous level.
2) Independent variables with two related groups measured at the categorical
level. The independent variable is the commencement of the DOJCRD
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investigation and the two related groups will be the dependent variables
measured before and after the investigation commences.
3) There should be no significant outliers in the differences between the two
related groups. I did find outliers in the data and after finding neither a data
entry or measurement error, I compared the results of the paired-samples t-test
with and without the outliers. I found a small difference in significance result
and made the decision to continue using all data points despite the outliers.
4) The distribution of the differences in the dependent variable between the
related groups should be approximately normally distributed. Because the
paired-samples t-test is robust to violations of normality, especially when
using the entire population, violations of this assumption can somewhat be
tolerated and still provide valid results. To test for this assumption, I used the
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (i.e., p > .05) and reported the skewness values
when I analyzed individual cities. When I analyzed the data in the aggregate I
used a Q-Q Plot to determine normality and reported both the skewness and
kurtosis values.
5) I reported the mean, standard deviation, and 95% confidence intervals, which
establish the magnitude of the mean difference and its likely range. For
significance I considered the obtained t-value, degrees of freedom and the
significance 2-tailed p-value. Findings of p < .05 indicated the mean
difference between the two related groups was statistically significant, and the
null hypothesis was rejected. Alternatively, findings of p > .05 indicated the
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mean difference between the two related groups was not statistically
significant, and the null hypothesis was accepted. I reported the results at 1, 2,
and 3-year intervals to establish any pattern that may exist in change over
time.
Threats to Validity
The use of data from the Uniform Crime Rate (UCR) is not without its
limitations. Each year, more than 18,000 agencies contribute data to the FBI. The FBI
recognizes the problems facing local law enforcement agencies and the possibility that
for any number of reasons they cannot report. Non-reporting could make a difference,
especially in the national crime rate. Another issue is the definitions of state crimes
competing with definitions of crime for UCR purposes. Because crime definitions vary
from state to state, the FBI requires agencies to report offenses not according to local and
state statues, but according to the guidelines of the UCR. Although the FBI believes most
agencies make a good faith effort to comply with these guidelines, there is very little
follow-through on their part to make sure that guidelines are being followed (FBI, 2017).
Another potential threat to validity is the data are based on reported crime and not
necessarily actual crime. In Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago an event occurred
involving an African American and police and this led to civil discourse. Desmond,
Papachristos, and Kirk (2016) found that when highly publicized police use of force
events occurred involving African American’s there was a significant decrease in the
number of calls to 911 for police involvement in the Black community. Over time, the
number of 911 calls returned to original levels. They argue that episodic events of highly

47
publicized police use of excessive force creates legal cynicism within the community and
people turn to street justice, rather than to the police when legal intervention is needed.
Pew Research Center reported the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) in 2016
found only 42% of violent crime was reported to police (Gramlich, 2018). This
disturbingly high number could certainly impact the findings of this study when it comes
to violent crime data. This information is based off UCR data, which later I discuss the
many issues surrounding their results, and an annual survey conducted by the BJS which
is also fraught with many interpretation issues. Despite these assertions there may be a
difference between true and reported crime and this could threaten validity.
Due to potential issues with the data, I chose to only use violent crime rates. Part
I, violent crime offenses include; murder and nonnegligent homicide, rape (legacy and
revised), robbery, and aggravated assault. I believe the data are much cleaner when
limited to only Part I, violent crime offenses because there is less ambiguity in defining
Part I offenses as opposed to Part II offenses such as theft and assault. These are also
crimes that are seemingly more likely to be reported to law enforcement despite legal
cynicism.
I used the national crime rate as a nonequivalent control variable. This decision
was based on the variable having the ability to be a neutral indicator for comparison with
an agency that has come under scrutiny of the DOJCRD. Others have attempted to look at
cities with similar demographics for crime rate comparison, but this is fraught with
problems (Rushin & Edwards, 2017). Trying to find two cities with nearly identical
characteristics opens the door for validity issues. Just matching economic and race factors
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alone creates many questionable data problems. The national crime rate has issues as
well, however, fluctuations in the national crime rate occur for similar reasons that a local
crime rate will. Multiple time series is used to tease out the differences over time with the
emphasis on a specific point in time. If fluctuations are occurring in the local crime rate,
before the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, and they differ significantly from
the national crime rate, this may affect the validity gained using a nonequivalent control
variable.
Arrest rates will include all arrests made by a local law enforcement agency. The
purpose of arrest rate analysis is to tease out information that may point toward depolicing. There may be other reasons for changes in arrest rates, and this does go to
validity. However, the theory behind de-policing is that officers are turning a blind eye to
crimes they otherwise wouldn’t, and ultimately this is leading to more crime occurring.
Again, multiple time series will be used to tease out the differences over time with the
emphasis on a specific point in time. If decreases in arrest rates occur with the
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, this strengthens the argument of depolicing.
Summary
The intended goal of this study was to analyze the before and after effect on
violent crime and arrest rates of cities with law enforcement agencies that have come
under scrutiny by the DOJCRD. The population for the study includes all agencies that
have come under the scrutiny of the DOJCRD for multiple allegations of patterns and
practice of Constitutional or civil rights violations. The data is available through the
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UCR, local law enforcement agencies, and the DOJCRD. For the study I used a
quantitative, quasi-experimental, multiple time-series research design and SPSS for the
analysis. Any changes to the data or analysis methods required the consensus of the
Committee members and is thoroughly documented and reported.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to consider correlations that may exist between the
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
violent crime and arrest rates of that city. The null hypothesis is that violent crime and
arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of these investigations.
Alternatively, violent crime and arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement
of a DOJCRD patterns and practice investigation. The use of a nonequivalent control
variable, the national crime rate, was used for comparison information. Arrest rates were
considered to tease out the possibility of de-policing resulting from federal scrutiny.
In this chapter, I present information about data collection and the issues
surrounding data cleaning for accurate comparisons. I then present the results of the
analysis on two levels, city by city and in the aggregate. Using this information to inform
my decision, I present my final determinations regarding null hypothesis testing and my
research questions.
Data Collection
Upon IRB approval (02-13-18-0631789), my first step in data collection was to
identify the cities and time frames for the analysis. To do this I looked at several sources
for verification because the DOJCRD site was ambiguous at best. As the research
evolved I found there were some credible sources for cross referencing such as the
University of Michigan Law School (Civil Rights Litigation Clearing House, n.d.) and
Frontline, Fixing the Force (Frontline’s Enterprise Journalism Group, n.d.). Ultimately, I
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determined that since given the ability by Congress to investigate law enforcement
agencies in 1994, the DOJCRD has conducted 69 investigations. Not all these
investigations are multi-faceted patterns and practice investigations. For instance, in one
case, a single minority employee alleged discrimination in the promotional process and
this prompted the DOJCRD to investigate. I began by examining the cause for each
investigation and deciding if it met the requirements for my study.
After exhaustively researching the cause of DOJCRD intervention, I then began
looking at cities that I had identified being within the parameters of the research. I had to
eliminate some agencies because they are state or county agencies, and I could not assess
individual cities violent crime rates based on broad data from these agencies. Once I
identified the cities included in the research, I began collecting violent crime and arrest
data.
I found data collection more difficult than I had anticipated. I assumed that UCR
data was accurate, but I found some instances that it was not. I also anticipated the data
were gathered consistently from agency to agency, but I found this was also not the case.
In several instances, the UCR had violent crime and arrest data for each month as
anticipated, but in many cases, they only had annual data. Another difficulty was that
despite DOJCRD over-sight there was no UCR data available for several agencies.
Additionally, no consent decree or memo of understanding that I reviewed included a
provision requiring an agency to report statistics to the UCR.
To resist reducing my sample size, I contacted many agencies where data was not
available through the UCR. Most of the time this required a Freedom of Information Act
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form submission. Although all agencies responded to my request, many were unable to
provide data because it was not available. I found the older the data I was requesting, the
more likely they would not be able to find it. As with the UCR, in many instances, I
could get violent crime data but was not able to get arrest data. Just as was found with the
UCR, many times the data was only available on an annual basis rather than monthly.
Because of this, my analysis changed from considering 36 months before and after the
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation to 3 years before and after the
commencement. I did have occasions when the data by the UCR was inaccurate, and in
these instances, I chose to decrease sample size if I could not confirm the data through
the individual agency.
For both research questions, I examined changes in the mean before and after the
commencement of the DOJCRD investigation. I used three data points, n = 3, at 1, 2, and
3 years before and after the commencement of the DOJCRD investigation. The year
listed by the DOJCRD for when the investigation began was used as Year 1 of the post
investigation data. Ultimately, I analyzed violent crime rate data from 35 cities
individually and 37 cities as a whole. Baltimore and Chicago did not have 2017 data as of
the time of this research, so I was limited to data for 2 years in these cities. I analyzed
arrest rates for only 25 cities due to unavailable data through the UCR or local law
enforcement agency. I have provided a list of agency analysis decisions and any issues
with data for all agencies considered in Table 1.
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Table 1
Agency Analysis Decisions, Explanations, and Data Issues
Agency

Analysis (Yes, No)

Torrance, CA, May 1995

No

Adelanto, CA, June 1995

No

Pittsburgh, PA, April 1996

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Reasoning
No action taken by the DOJ and
no information available as to the
extent of the investigation.
No action taken by the DOJ and
no information available as to the
extent of the investigation.

Issues

The UCR has no data
currently available for
arrests. New Orleans
offered the data for a
considerable price.

New Orleans, LA, April 1996

Yes, however only crime
data is available.

New Jersey State Police, April
1996

No

Los Angeles, CA, July 1996

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Steubenville, OH, September
1996

No

Illinois State Police

No

Montgomery, MD, June 1996

Yes, however only crime
data is available.

Beverly Hills, Ca, February
1997

No

Orange County Sheriff’s Office,
FL April 1997

No

The population for this study only
includes “cities” that have come
under scrutiny of the DOJ.

New York Police Department
(Eastern Dist.), NY, December
1997

No

UCR stats are not broke down by
NYPD district. NYPD has the
stats but stated there are no
specific boundaries.

Buffalo, NY, December 1997

No

The investigation was for pepper
spray use only and not an agency
wide patterns and practice
investigation.

Columbus, OH, March 1998

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Eastpointe, MI, March 1998

No

Washington, D.C., February
1999

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

The population for this study only
includes “cities” that have come
under scrutiny of the DOJ.

No data reported to the UCR and
currently unavailable through the
agency.
The population for this study only
includes “cities” that have come
under scrutiny of the DOJ.
Arrest data not available through
the UCR or MCPD.
There is no documentation
available through the DOJ on this
investigation and its status is
closed.

Crime data is currently
unavailable for all years prior to
the investigation and no arrest
data is available.

(table continues)
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Agency

Analysis (Yes, No)

New York (Southern District),
NY, March 1999

No

Charleston, WV, March 1999

Yes, however only crime data
analysis.

Prince George’s County, MD,
July 1999

Yes, however only crime data
analysis.

Riverside, CA, July 1999

No

Mount Prospect, IL, April 2000
Highland Park, IL, May 2000

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, however only crime data
analysis.

Cleveland, OH, August 2000

No

Prince George’s County, MD,
October 2000

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Tulsa, OK, February, 2001

No

Cincinnati, OH, May 2001

Yes, however only crime data
analysis.

Detroit, MI, May 2001
Schenectady, NY, April 2001

Yes, however only crime
data analysis.

Miami, FL, May 2002

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Providence, RI, December 2002

No

Villa Rica, GA, December 2002

No

Alabaster, AL, March 2003

No

Bakersfield, CA, June 2003

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Island,
March 2004

No

St. Croix, Virgin Island, March
2004

No

Warren, OH, December 2004

Issues

No arrest data available through
the UCR or HPPD.
This was a use of force
complaint and not an agency
wide patterns and practice
investigation.

This was an internal
investigation brought by one
officer alleging discriminatory
treatment against him.
Arrest data is only available for
one year through the UCR and
CPD.

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Portland, ME, May 2002

Beacon, NY, August 2004

Reasoning
UCR stats are not broke down
by NYPD district. NYPD has
the stats but stated there are no
specific boundaries.
Arrest data through the UCR is
unavailable and the agency
confirmed no arrest data is
available.
Arrest data is not available for
two years.
This investigation was
monitored by the DOJ but
conducted by a State agency.

Arrest data is not available for
two years through the UCR or
PPD.

No action taken by the DOJ and
no information available as to
the extent of the investigation.
Crime and arrest data not
available through the UCR or
agency for 2001
Crime and arrest data not
available through the UCR or
agency for years 2000 and 2005

Crime and arrest data not
available through the UCR or
agency.
Crime and arrest data not
available through the UCR or
agency.

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

(table continues)
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Agency
Easton., PA, October 2005
Orange County Sheriff’s Office,
FL, January 2007
Austin, TX, May 2007
Yonkers, NY August 2007

Analysis (Yes, No)
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
No

No

Lorain, OH, November 2008

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Harvey, Illinois, December 2008

Yes, however only crime
data analysis.

Escambia County Sheriff’s
Office, FL, January 2009

No

Maricopa County, AZ, March
2009

No

Suffolk County, NY, September
2009
East Haven, CT, September
2009

New Orleans, LA, May 2010

Seattle, WA, March 2011

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Colorado City, AZ, April 2011

No

No arrest data available through
the UCR or HPD.
The population for this study
only includes “cities” that have
come under scrutiny of the
DOJ.
The population for this study
only includes “cities” that have
come under scrutiny of the
DOJ.

The UCR has no data
currently available for
arrests. New Orleans
offered the data for a
considerable price.
The population for this study
only includes “cities” that have
come under scrutiny of the
DOJ.

The only data available through
the UCR and the agency is from
2009, 2010 and 2011.

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Officer, Antelope Valley, CA,
August 2011

No

Miami, FL, November 2011

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Meridian, MI, December 2001

Crime and arrest data not
available through the UCR or
agency.

Yes, however only crime
data analysis.

No

Portland, OR, June 2011

The population for this study
only includes “cities” that have
come under scrutiny of the
DOJ.

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Alamance County, NC, June
2010

Newark, NJ, May 2011

Issues

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Puerto Rico Police Department,
July 2008

Inglewood, CA, March 2009

Reasoning

No

The population for this study
only includes “cities” that have
come under scrutiny of the
DOJ.

This was not an agency wide
patterns and practice
investigation this was for
juveniles arrested from a high
school.

(table continues)
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Agency

Analysis (Yes, No)

Missoula Police Department,
MT April 2012

No

University of Montana, MT
April 2012
Albuquerque, NM, November
2012
Cleveland, OH, March 2013
Ferguson, MO, September 2014

No

Issues

Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.
Yes, both crime and arrest
data available.

Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s
Office, LA

No

Ville Platte, LA, April 2015

No

Baltimore, MD, May 2015

Yes, in aggregate analysis
only.

Chicago, IL, December 2015

Yes, in aggregate analysis
only.

Orange County Sheriffs Officer,
FL, December 2016

Reasoning
This was not an agency wide
patterns and practice
investigation. This was for how
the agency is handling sexual
assault cases.
This was not an agency wide
patterns and practice
investigation. This was for how
the agency is handling sexual
assault cases.

No

This was not an agency wide
patterns and practice
investigation. This investigation
involved detention hold policies
of the local police and sheriff’s
department.
This was not an agency wide
patterns and practice
investigation. This investigation
involved detention hold policies
of the local police and sheriff’s
department.
Limited to two years
because 2017 data is
currently unavailable.
Limited to two years
because 2017 data is
currently unavailable.
This was not an agency wide
investigation. This was
concerning the use of jail house
informants by the sheriff’s
department and District
Attorney’s office.
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Results
The analysis began with testing for the assumptions of no significant outliers and
distribution of the differences in the dependent variables, violent crime rate, arrest rate,
and national crime rate being approximately normally distributed. Because the
assumption of outliers is tested on the difference scores between the two paired
observations, I used SPSS to compute the differences. I chose to use boxplots to assess
for outliers due to the number of tests being conducted and a low N. In all 35 tests I found
no outliers in the data as assessed by inspection of the boxplots.
For tests of normality I intended to record kurtosis values due to the value of
leptokurtic and platykurtic distribution data; however, individual cities ultimately had < 8
pre- and post-data points due to annual reporting versus monthly reporting. I will report
kurtosis values when analyzing data in the aggregate. Skewness results are provided for
individual cities and for further support for testing of normality I chose the Shapiro-Wilk
test rather than a Normal Q-Q Plot because the sample size on each test was < 50. For the
Shapiro-Wilk test, I used the commonly accepted p > .05 indicating the data is normally
distributed and accepting the null hypothesis. Alternatively, if I found p < .05 the data
was considered not normally distributed thus rejecting the null hypothesis and creating
the need for addressing violations of normality. In testing the individual cities, the df = 3
in all the Shapiro-Wilk tests and df = 2 in all paired samples t-test so this information was
excluded from the table. In all, I found seven tests where p < .05 from the Shapiro-Wilk
test of normality. Considering there are multiple tests being conducted on each city, and
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then again in the aggregate, and the fact that the paired samples t-test is considered robust
to violations of normality, I chose to continue without transforming the data.
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Table 2
Tests for Distribution Normality
City
Pittsburgh, PA, April 1996
New Orleans, LA, April
1996
Los Angeles, CA, July 1996
Montgomery, MD, June
1996
Columbus, OH, March 1998
Washington, D.C., February
1999
Charleston, WV, March
1999
Prince George’s County,
MD, July 1999
Mount Prospect, IL, April
2000
Highland Park, IL, May 2000
Prince George’s County,
MD, October 2000
Cincinnati, OH, May 2001

Detroit, MI, May 2001
Schenectady, NY, April
2001
Portland, ME, May 2002

Miami, FL, May 2002

Bakersfield, CA, June 2003

Beacon, NY, August 2004

Variable
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR

Skewness
-1.73
.108
.696
1.17
NA
1.49
1.14
-1.67
.696
.542
NA
.696
1.73
NA
-.627
-.310
.345
-1.42
-1.60
NA
-1.42
-1.67
NA
-1.42
-.413
-.729
-.318
1.73
NA
.173
1.73
-1.38
.173
1.29
NA
1.06
1.60
-1.49
1.06
-1.32
.987
1.06
-1.59
NA
1.68
-.961
.677
1.68
1.02
-1.68
-1.35
.996
1.16
-.087

Shapiro-Wilk Statistic
.765
1.00
.981
.940
NA
.981
.944
.825
.981
.989
NA
.981
.754
NA
.985
.996
.996
.901
.853
NA
.901
.826
NA
.901
.994
.979
.996
.757
NA
.999
.760
.908
.999
.924
NA
.952
.853
.887
.952
.918
.960
.952
.856
NA
.819
.962
.982
.819
.957
.819
.914
.959
.942
1.00

Shapiro-Wilk Sig.
.034
.960
.737
.527
NA
.737
.543
.176
.737
.797
NA
.737
.009
NA
.764
.886
.872
.388
.248
NA
.388
.177
NA
.388
.847
.723
.882
.015
NA
.936
.021
.411
.936
.467
NA
.579
.249
.344
.579
.446
.614
.579
.257
NA
.160
.625
.744
.160
.599
.161
.432
.610
.535
.968

(table continues)
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City
Warren, OH, December 2004

Easton., PA, October 2005

Austin, TX, May 2007

Yonkers, NY August 2007

Lorain, OH, November 2008
Harvey, Illinois, December
2008
Inglewood, CA, March 2009
Suffolk County, NY,
September 2009
East Haven, CT, September
2009
New Orleans, LA, May 2010

Seattle, WA, March 2011

Newark, NJ, May 2011

Portland, OR, June 2011

Miami, FL, November 2011
Albuquerque, NM,
November 2012
Cleveland, OH, March 2013
Ferguson, MO, September
2014

Variable
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR
CR
AR
NCR

Skewness
-.647
1.36
-.432
1.60
-1.54
-.432
1.39
-.855
.830
-.775
-1.73
.830
-1.50
-1.57
-.446
-.568
NA
-.389
-1.40
1.04
-.389
.438
.785
-.389
-.087
.086
-.389
1.17
NA
-1.21
1.63
.419
1.07
.168
.637
1.07
1.41
-.573
1.07
1.72
-.468
1.07
-1.73
-.076
.490
-1.73
1.73
-.752
.363
NA
-1.71

Shapiro-Wilk Statistic
.984
.911
.993
.852
.872
.993
.906
.971
.972
.976
.770
.972
.882
.865
.992
.988
NA
.994
.905
.954
.994
.993
.976
.994
1.00
1.00
.994
.940
NA
.936
.842
.993
.951
.999
.984
.951
.903
.987
.951
.789
.992
.951
.761
1.00
.991
.755
.762
.978
.995
NA
.792

Shapiro-Wilk Sig.
.756
.423
.839
.246
.300
.839
.404
.672
.682
.705
.044
.682
.330
.282
.834
.787
NA
.856
.400
.589
.787
.837
.700
.787
.971
.968
.787
.528
NA
.510
.221
.844
.576
.938
.760
.576
.394
.785
.576
.089
.826
.576
.023
.972
.818
.011
.026
.714
.865
NA
.096
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Analysis of the individual cities unveiled violent crime rate means decreasing
after the commencement of the DOJCRD investigation in 20 cities and increasing in 15
cities. However, during the same time frame, the national crime rate mean decreased at a
much greater rate. Arrest rates were found to decline in 23 of 25 cities analyzed, and in
all but two of the cities the effect size was medium to large. To establish the magnitude of
the difference between the two variables, I used Cohen’s d to indicate effect size. For
interpretation I used the values 0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium and 0.8 = large. I found a large
effect size, in 13 cities when violent crime rates were decreasing and 10 cities when the
rate was increasing. There was medium effect size in five cities when the violent crime
rate was falling and five cities when it was rising. The other three cities showed a small
effect size with two decreasing and one increasing.
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Table 3
City by City Analysis
City

Var.
CR

Pittsburgh, PA,
April 1996

AR
NCR
CR

New Orleans, LA,
April 1996

AR
NCR
CR

Los Angeles, CA,
July 1996

AR
NCR
CR

Montgomery, MD,
June 1996

AR
NCR
CR

Columbus, OH,
March 1998

AR
NCR
CR

Washington, D.C.,
February 1999

AR
NCR
CR

Charleston, WV,
March 1999

AR
NCR

Prince George’s
County, MD, July
1999

CR
AR
NCR
CR

Mount Prospect,
IL, April 2000

AR
NCR
CR

Highland Park, IL,
May 2000

AR
NCR

Pre and
Post M
1103
827
5656
4247
5378
4877
2061
1466
NA
5378
4877
2156
1584
3439
4406
5378
4877
281
254
NA
5378
4877
988
838
NA
5096
4336
2071
1581
12051
9973
4877
4185
1068
1007
NA
4877
4185
1064
1263
NA
4877
4185
95
148
1000
991
4603
4137
78
75
NA
4603
4137

M

SD

95% CI

t

Sig.

d

275

87

[59, 492]

5.47

.032

3.16

1409

760

[-479, 3296]

3.21

.085

1.85

501

344

[-354, 1356]

2.52

.128

1.46

595

205

[86, 1104]

5.03

.037

2.90

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

344

[-354, 1356]

2.52

.128

1.46

572

400

[-422, 1566]

2.48

.132

1.43

-967

947

[-3320, 385]

-1.77

.219

-1.02

501

344

[-354, 1356]

2.52

.128

1.46

27

18

[-17, 71]

2.63

.119

1.5

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

501

344

[-354, 1356]

2.52

.128

1.5

149

57

[7, 291]

4.53

.045

2.61

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

761

422

[-288, 1810]

3.12

.089

1.80

490

386

[-470, 1450]

2.20

.159

1.26

2078

1463

[-1557, 5713]

2.46

.133

1.42

692

303

[-62, 1445]

3.95

.058

2.28

501

61

90

[-163, 284]

1.17

.364

.68

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

692

303

[-62, 1446]

3.95

.058

2.28

-199

461

[-1344, 945]

-.750

.532

-0.43

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

692

303

[-62, 1446]

3.95

.058

2.28

-54

31

[-130, 23]

-3.02

.095

-1.74

9

214

[-522, 540]

.072

.949

.04

466

350

[-404, 1335]

2.31

.148

1.33

3

37

[-89, 95]

.133

.906

.08

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

466

330

[-355, 1287]

244

.135

1.41

(table continues)
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City

Var.
CR

Prince George’s
County, MD,
October 2000

AR
NCR
CR

Cincinnati, OH,
May 2001

AR
NCR
CR

Detroit, MI, May
2001

AR
NCR
CR

Schenectady, NY,
April 2001

AR
NCR
CR

Portland, ME, May
2002

AR
NCR
CR

Miami, FL, May
2002

AR
NCR
CR

Bakersfield, CA,
June 2003

AR
NCR
CR

Beacon, NY,
August 2004

AR
NCR
CR

Warren, OH,
December 2004

AR
NCR
CR

Easton., PA,
October 2005

AR
NCR

Pre and
Post M
986
1019
887
645
4603
4137
948
1203
NA
4336
4118
2355
2094
6674
4849
4336
4118
696
823
6756
6740
4336
4118
302
354
NA
4185
4055
2072
1820
13558
10301
4185
4055
347
627
4863
5335
4137
3982
446
457
5258
3106
4117
3895
834
1176
5158
3784
4056
3813
698
609
3475
3410
4056
3813

M

SD

95% CI

t

Sig.

d

-33

46

[-146, 80]

-1.25

.337

-.72

242

133

[-88, 571]

3.16

.087

1.82

466

330

[-355, 1287]

2.44

.135

1.41

-255

352

[-1130, 620]

-1.25

.336

-.72

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

217

300

[-529, 964]

1.25

.337

.72

261

181

[-188, 711]

2.50

.130

1.44

1825

1444

[-1763, 5414]

2.19

.160

1.26

217

300

[-529, 964]

1.25

.337

.72

-126

88

[-345, 92]

-2.48

.131

-1.43

16

1289

[-3186, 3218]

.022

.985

.01

217

300

[-529, 964]

1.25

.337

.72

-52

44

[-161, 56]

-2.07

.174

-1.18

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

129

139

[-216, 475]

475

1.60

.249

252

202

[-248, 753]

2.17

.162

1.25

3257

1581

[-672, 7185]

3.57

.070

2.06

129

139

[-216, 475]

1.61

.249

.93

-280

113

[-560, .41]

-4.30

.050

-2.48

-473

340

[-1318, 373]

-2.41

.138

-1.39

156

87

[-60, 372]

3.10

.090

1.79

-12

34

[-97, 73]

-.603

.608

-.35

2152

2198

[-3307, 7611]

1.70

.232

.98

223

134

[-111, 555]

2.87

.103

1.66

-342

373

[-1269, 584]

-1.59

.253

-.92

1375

394

[395, 2353]

6.04

.026

3.49

243

159

[-153, 640]

2.64

.118

1.53

89

115

[-198, 375]

1.33

.315

.77

65

618

[-1471, 1601]

.182

.873

.11

243

159

[-153, 640]

2.64

.118

1.53

(table continues)
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City

Var.
CR

Austin, TX, May
2007

AR
NCR
CR

Yonkers, NY
August 2007

AR
NCR
CR

Lorain, OH,
November 2008

AR
NCR
CR

Harvey, Illinois,
December 2008

AR
NCR
CR

Inglewood, CA,
March 2009

AR
NCR
CR

Suffolk County,
NY, September
2009

AR
NCR
CR

East Haven, CT,
September 2009

AR
NCR
CR

New Orleans, LA,
May 2010

AR
NCR
CR

Seattle, WA,
March 2011

AR
NCR
CR

Newark, NJ, May
2011

AR
NCR

Pre and
Post M
510
529
6815
7693
3895
3622
488
460
3014
3056
3895
3622
466
537
5238
4051
3813
3495
1926
1733
NA
3736
3369
893
806
3325
2631
3736
3369
172
153
2582
2234
3736
3369
145
119
3791
2335
3736
3369
1120
787
NA
3622
3300
598
594
3476
2481
3495
3220
974
1195
7813
4405
3495
3220

M

SD

95% CI

t

Sig.

d

-19

18

[-64, 26]

-1.78

.216

-1.06

-878

750

[-2741, 985]

-2.03

.180

-1.17

274

220

[-273, 820]

2.15

.164

1.25

29

27

[-40, 97]

1.81

.213

1.07

-43

95

[-279, 194]

-.774

.520

-0.45

274

220

[-273, 820]

2.15

.164

1.25

-71

50

[-196, 55]

-2.43

.136

-1.42

1233

858

[-899, 3364]

2.49

.131

1.44

318

245

[-291, 927]

2.25

.154

1.30

192

318

[-598, 983]

1.05

.405

.60

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

366

156

[-22, 755]

4.06

.056

2.35

87

123

[-220, 393]

1.22

.348

.71

694

170

[272, 1115]

7.08

.019

4.08

366

156

[-22, 755]

4.06

.056

2.35

19

29

[-53, 91]

1.31

.376

.66

348

305

[-407, 1104]

1.98

.186

1.14

366

156

[-22, 755]

4.06

.056

2.35

26

23

[-31, 83]

1.94

.192

1.13

1456

1242

[-1631, 4542]

2.03

.192

1.17

366

156

[-22, 755]

4.06

.056

2.35

333

374

[-597, 1263]

1.54

.263

.89

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

322

186

[-140, 784]

3.00

.095

1.73

5

29

[-67, 76]

.276

.808

.17

995

482

[-201, 2191]

3.58

.070

2.06

275

256

[-360, 910]

1.86

.204

1.07

-221

94

[-454, 12]

-4.08

.055

-2.35

3408

1472

[-249, 7065]

4.01

.057

2.32

275

256

[-360, 910]

1.86

.204

1.07

(table continues)
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City

Var.
CR

Portland, OR, June
2011

AR
NCR
CR

Miami, FL,
November 2011

AR
NCR
CR

Albuquerque, NM,
November 2012

AR
NCR
CR

Cleveland, OH,
March 2013

AR
NCR
CR

Ferguson, MO,
September 2014

AR
NCR

Pre and
Post M
566
505
4129
3116
3495
3220
1248
1184
8365
7050
3495
3220
773
802
5932
4489
3369
3105
1383
1527
2855
2074
3300
2981
446
752
NA
3220
3237

M

SD

95% CI

t

Sig.

d

61

70

[-111, 234]

1.53

.266

.87

1013

624

[-1671, 3697]

1.62

.246

1.62

275

256

[-360, 910]

1.86

.204

1.07

64

77

[-126, 255]

1.46

.283

.83

1315

352

[440, 2189]

6.47

.023

3.74

275

256

[-360, 910]

1.86

.204

1.07

-30

73

[-210, 151]

-.710

.551

-.41

1443

926

[-856, 3743]

2.70

.114

1.56

265

242

[-338, 867]

1.89

.199

1.10

-143

81

[-346, 59]

-3.05

.093

-1.77

781

638

[-805, 2366]

2.12

.168

1.22

318

163

[-86, 723]

3.39

.077

1.95

-306

230

[-877, 265]

-2.30

.148

-1.33

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

-17

736

[-1844, 1811]

-.039

.973

-0.02

Despite large effect sizes on most of the results, the change in violent crime rate
was statistically significant in only Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, New Orleans, Louisiana,
Columbus, Ohio, and Bakersfield, California. Of these four cities, three were
significantly reducing their violent crime rate’s while Bakersfield was significantly
increasing its violent crime rate. Despite arrest rates being down in most cities with a
large effects size, only three cities indicated a statistically significant result: Warren,
Ohio, Inglewood, California, and Miami, Florida. Given wide confidence intervals in
most of the results, and a small n = 3, I didn’t feel I had enough evidence to support
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis at this point. Because wide confidence intervals
often indicate the need for larger sample size, I decided to analyze the data in the
aggregate.
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Analysis of Aggregate Data
For hypothesis testing of the aggregate data, I again used a paired samples t-test.
Before conducting the analysis, I tested for the assumptions of no significant outliers and
distribution of the differences in the dependent variable’s being approximately normally
distributed. Using boxplots to identify outliers, SPSS detected nine outliers with four
extreme outliers in the violent crime rate variable, two outliers in the arrest rate variable
and five outliers with the national crime rate variable. To determine the effect the
extreme outliers were having on the mean of the violent crime rate variable I eliminated
all extreme outlier data points from the data set and ran an analysis. I found a small
increase in the significance level. Based on this information I decided to continue using
all data points.
Because n > 50 (violent crime rate n = 109, arrest rate n = 76, national crime rate
n = 109) I chose to use a Q-Q Plot for analysis of normal distribution. I found in all three
analyses, i.e. violent crime rate, arrest rate, and national crime rate, the data were
normally distributed based off Q-Q Plot observation. I also considered skew and kurtosis
levels well within allowable limits for each variable: violent crime rate (skewness =.604,
SE .231, kurtosis = 2.66, SE .459), arrest rate (skewness = .829, SE .276, kurtosis = 1.04,
SE .545) and national crime rate (skewness = .022, SE .231, kurtosis = 1.93, SE .459).
Correlations analysis also indicate the paired samples t-test is appropriate (violent crime
rate, r = .902, p < .001, arrest rate, r = .883, p < .001 and national crime rate, r = .896, p <
.001).
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Results of Aggregate Testing
Violent crime rate means decreased from before the DOJCRD investigation
commenced (M = 932, SD = 636) as opposed to (M = 901, SD = 534) but were not
statistically significant M = 31, SD = 277, 95% CI [-21, 84], t(108) = 1.17, p > .05 @
.244, d = 0.11. When compared to the nonequivalent control variable, national crime rate,
which also decreased, there is a remarkable difference, (M = 4163, SD = 669) as opposed
to (M = 3803, SD = 584) and was found statistically significant, M = 360, SD = 297, 95%
CI [303,416], t(108) = 12.63, p < .05 @ .001, d = 1.21. Not only was the violent crime
rate difference not statistically significant, the effect size was very low. Comparatively,
the national crime rate mean during the same time frame was found significantly
decreasing with a large effect size. For comparison, the violent crime rate mean
decreased by 3% before and after the commencement of the investigation while during
the same time frame the national crime rate mean decreased at a three-times greater rate
of 9%.
Arrest rates means also decreased post DOJCRD investigation (M = 5281, SD =
2998) as opposed to (M = 4261, SD = 2481) and were statistically significant, M = 1020,
SD = 1418, 95% CI [696, 1344], t(75) = 6.27, p < .05 @ .001, d = 0.72. Not only were
arrest rate means significantly decreasing pre- to post-DOJCRD investigation, they were
nearing a large effect size.
Research Questions and Hypothesis Results
For this study I considered two research questions and hypothesis to evaluate each
question:
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RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
violent crime rates?
H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency.
Considering the evidence from the analysis of the individual cities and then in the
aggregate, I must conclude that although violent crime rates were falling, the results were
not statistically significant, and the effect was trivial at best. Therefore, I accept the null
hypothesis that violent crime rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation. However, when analyzed in the aggregate, most cities that came
under the scrutiny of DOJCRD investigations did not experience decreases in their
violent crime rates as the rest of the nation did during the same time frame. These results
also don’t consider the possibility of non-reported crime.
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
arrest rates?
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a law enforcement agency.
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The evidence supports a relationship between DOJCRD investigations and agency
arrest rates. When considered individually, arrest rates fell in 23 of 25 cities analyzed
with a mostly large effect size. In the aggregate, arrest rates declined significantly with
medium to large effect size. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the
alternative that arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation and find the arrest rate difference declining significantly.
Additional Observations of the Data
For this study I analyzed all available data since the DOJCRD was granted this
power in 1994. In that time the United States had three Presidential administrations,
Clinton, Bush, and Obama. Knowing that ideologies change with Presidential
administrations, I compared the data for the years of each President.
During the years of the Clinton administration (1993 – 2001, however the first
city analyzed was in 1996) a total of 11 cities were analyzed. Of the 11 cities, eight were
found to increase their violent crime rates while the other three decreased. Arrest rate
data was available for only five of the 11 cities. I found arrest rates increasing in one city
and decreasing in the other four.
For the Bush administration (2001 – 2009) I analyzed 13 cities for their violent
crime rates and 10 cities arrest rates. I found violent crime rates increasing in six cities
and decreasing in seven cities. Arrest rates increased in three cities but decreased in the
other seven.
Under the Obama administration (2009 – 2017) I analyzed 13 cities violent crime
rates and 11 cities arrest rates. I found six cities where violent crime was increasing and
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seven cities where it was decreasing. Arrest rates in all 11 cities decreased. The data
clearly show that starting in 2012, violent crime rates in the cities I analyzed began to
increase remarkably, post commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. This phenomenon
becomes more evident with time and by 2017, violent crime rate means differences are
consistently rising at an alarming rate and arrest rates have dropped off dramatically post
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. This includes the years the DOJCRD
investigated, Ferguson, Missouri, Baltimore, Maryland, and Chicago, Illinois.
The data support a conclusion that DOJCRD investigations are negatively
impacting violent crime and arrest rates at an increasing rate. More investigation is
needed to determine a potential cause, but the data support the notion that as Presidential
administrations change and perhaps ideologies change, the impact of DOJCRD
investigations on violent crime and arrest rates are affected.
Summary
The results indicate some correlation exist between local violent crime rates and
the commencement of a DOJCRD patterns and practice investigation. Although the mean
does decrease before and after the investigations commenced, the difference is not
statistically significant and has a low effect size. Comparatively, the national crime rate
during the same time frame did decrease significantly with a large effect size. Although
local violent crime rates for cities under scrutiny of the DOJCRD were found
insignificantly decreasing, crime rates in the United States were decreasing significantly
during the same time frame. Arrest rates decreased significantly with a medium to large
effect size when the DOJCRD commenced their investigation supporting the notion of
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de-policing. Both violent crime rates and arrest rates are being negatively affected at an
increasing rate with time. Some correlation exists with changes in Presidential
administrations. Graphing of the data are available in Appendix A and for emphasis, I
added trend lines.
In the final chapter, I summarize the study and discuss the implications of the
results. I provide discussion on what can be gleaned from the results of this study and
possible considerations for further research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Three cities—Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; and Chicago, Illinois—
have experienced significant increases in their violent crime rates and substantial
decreases in their arrest rates while the national crime rate is falling. A common thread
shared by these three cities is their local law enforcement agencies had come under the
scrutiny of the DOJCRD. This quantitative study was designed to analyze differences in
violent crime rates and arrest rates in all cities with law enforcement agencies that have
come under the scrutiny of the DOJCRD. The purpose of this research was to add to the
literature questioning why in some areas of the country crime rates are soaring while the
national crime rate is falling. Through research and data collection, I also unveiled the
need for further research into the efficacy of the DOJCRD due to concerns of bias,
questionable investigations, and enormous costs. The remainder of this chapter includes
an overview of the study and the information discovered during data collection. I first
provide answers to the research questions through hypothesis testing results and examine
how these results add to the literature regarding substantial increases in crime in certain
areas of the country.
Summary of Key Findings
Using data from 3 years before and 3 years after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation (n = 3) I analyzed 35 cities’ violent crime rates and 25 cities’
arrest rates. I found that the mean for violent crime rates decreased but at a nonsignificant
level with low effect size. Using the national crime rate as a nonequivalent control
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variable, I found the mean decreased significantly during the same time frame at a
medium to large effect size, and at three-times the rate of cities under DOJCRD scrutiny.
Violent crime rates in the wake of these investigations became progressively worse
beginning in 2012, and by 2017 the pre- and post-differences are at an alarming rate.
To tease out the possibility of de-policing with the commencement DOJCRD
investigations, I analyzed arrest rates within the same time frames. I found arrest rate
means decreased at a statistically significant rate with a medium to large effect size. All
results held true when analyzed city by city or in the aggregate. As with violent crime
rates, arrest rates over time have become increasingly worse. All cities analyzed between
2009 and 2017, the years of the Obama administration, had significantly reduced arrest
rates.
Interpretation of Findings
I analyzed 35 cities’ violent crime rates and 25 cities’ arrest rates for 3 years
before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. The difference in the
number of cities analyzed was due to unavailability of arrest data for some cities. Using a
standard p < .05 with 95% confidence levels to reject the null hypothesis, and then
considering the effect size with means percentage differences for a thorough picture of
the data results, I come to the following conclusions.
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
violent crime rates?
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H01: The violent crime rate does not differ before and after the commencement of
a DOJCRD investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H11: The violent crime rate does differ before and after the commencement of a
DOJCRD investigation into a law enforcement agency.
In the city by city analysis, I found violent crime rate means decreasing in 20
cities and increasing in 15 when comparing data before and after the commencement of
the DOJCRD investigation. However, despite medium to large effect sizes, the difference
in violent crime rates was not statistically significant.
The results from the analysis of the data in the aggregate were similar with a nonstatistically significant result, p = .244, and small effect size d = .11. The results support
the conclusion to accept the null hypothesis and state there is no relationship between the
commencement of a DOJCRD investigation and differences in local violent crime rates.
Despite this assertion, when I compared the violent crime rate for each city to the analysis
of the nonequivalent control variable, the national crime rate, a difference presents itself.
The national crime rate analyzed during the same time frame did decrease at a
statistically significant level p = .001 with large effect size, d = 1.21. Results from the
aggregate analysis showed a 3% decrease in the mean local violent crime rate and a 9%
decrease in the mean national crime rate during the same time-frame. The data also
unveil that beginning in 2012, violent crime rates are progressively worsening in the
wake of these investigations. Despite the acceptance of the null hypothesis, the evidence
supports the notion that violent crime rates are negatively impacted by the
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commencement of a DOJCRD investigation, especially when considering the possibility
of nonreported crime.
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the commencement of a Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division investigation into a local law enforcement agency and
arrest rates?
H02: Arrest rates do not differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a local law enforcement agency.
H12: Arrest rates do differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD
investigation into a law enforcement agency.
Arrest rates were also analyzed city by city and in the aggregate. I found arrest
rates decreasing in most cities after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation.
Despite large effect sizes on most results, only three cities showed a statistically
significant decrease. No city showed a significant increase. When analyzed in the
aggregate, arrest rate means decreased at a significant level, p = .001 with medium to
large effect size, d = .72. Mean differences showed overall a 21% decrease from before
and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation.
Based on these results I reject the null hypothesis and find that arrest rates do
differ before and after the commencement of a DOJCRD investigation. This finding
establishes a relationship between the commencement of a DOJCRD investigations and
arrest rates declining. This finding supports the notion of de-policing due to DOJCRD
intervention.
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Limitations of the Study
The intended source for data was the Uniform Crime Rate (UCR). For this study,
I wanted to use only Part 1 offenses as defined by the UCR. I decided to use only Part 1
offenses primarily to keep the data as clean as possible. Each state and the federal
government tend to have different interpretations of crime classification, particularly in
Part Two offenses. For this reason, I only considered Part 1 violent crime offenses in the
study.
The law enforcement agencies in this study have come under the scrutiny of the
DOJCRD. Because of this, I believed the reporting of violent crime and arrest data by
each of the agencies would be accurate and complete. I found several agencies were not
reporting to the UCR. Some cities provided only crime data and not arrest data. In a
disturbingly high number of cases, the data are inaccurate, and I didn’t know if that was
due to the agency reporting or the regurgitation by the UCR. Initially, my research design
was to analyze month to month data for 36 months before and after the introduction of
the independent variable, the commencement of the DOJCRD investigation. Due to
inconsistent reporting, I had to alter the design to 3 years before and after the introduction
of the independent variable. So rather than having n = 36, I had to settle for n = 3. I also
found many mistakes where data were erroneous or just missing. These findings
prompted me to seek data from the individual agencies.
Using Freedom of Information Act request forms for several agencies, I was able
to retrieve more data than I would have through the UCR. I found the process of
gathering data from any source was very lengthy and cumbersome. Rather than to
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decrease sample size, I chose to work through these problems with data collection and
believe I have a comprehensive and complete list of all the data available. Despite this
assertion, some agencies are not included because violent crime and arrest data are not
available. Again, this is remarkable considering they have come under the scrutiny of the
DOJCRD who like the UCR are under the umbrella of the Department of Justice. I
believe that despite these setbacks with data collection, the results are trustworthy due to
persistent efforts in data collection which ultimately increased validity and
generalizability.
Another limitation for consideration is this study analyzed violent crime and
arrest rates. Besides the possibility of non-reported crime, there are many other potential
confounding variables associated with violent crime and arrest rates. I attempt to address
this through longitudinal research design. By analyzing 22 years of data (1995-2017)
from the entire population of agencies within the parameters of the research, validity and
reliability improve.
Recommendations
This study expands on the current research into the cause of substantial increases
in crime and decreases in police productivity in certain cities in the United States. These
changes are occurring while the national crime rate is substantially decreasing. To date,
researchers have considered many possibilities and, in some instances, have questioned
the efficacy of the DOJCRD.
To determine if an investigation by the DOJCRD fit within the parameters of this
study, I had to review DOJCRD findings from their investigation of local law
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enforcement agencies. The review was necessary to determine if the DOJCRD’s
investigation was an overarching pattern and practice investigation and to establish the
date the investigation commenced. Future researchers may want to look at these
investigations more thoroughly. Most of the findings contained in these reports were not
based on facts presented but rather the perceptions gleaned from documents reviewed,
officials interviewed, and responses from public advocacy groups. In one case, U.S.
District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder dismissed a case involving Alamance County
Sheriff’s Department because the DOJCRD did not present “reliable and persuasive
proof” of patterns and practice of civil rights abuses. The County Attorney for Alamance,
Clyde B. Albright was quoted saying, “Unfortunately, most law enforcement agencies are
afraid to challenge the civil rights division, even when its claims are completely bogus”
(Kelly, Childress & Rich, 2015).
In 2014, Missoula County Attorney, Fred Van Valkenburg received a national
award from the National District Attorney Association Board for his stand against the
DOJCRD. Van Valkenburg’s office was the target of a DOJCRD investigation into
alleged mishandling of sexual assault cases. Van Valkenburg accused the DOJCRD of
“bully tactics” and stated, “One of the most important things about challenging the DOJ’s
legal authority to investigate our office was to try and make sure other prosecutors were
not subject to the kind of illegal and unfair attacks we were forced to endure.” Michael
Moore, the president of the National District Attorney Association Board, was quoted,
“Van Valkenburg’s reaction to the DOJCRD set a precedent for future relationships
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between the federal government and locally elected officials” (Haake, 2014)(Kaste,
2014).
Support for DOJCRD findings appears more likely to be challenged in the future.
From my viewpoint as a retired investigator, the evidence presented in the findings
reports is very weak. Future researchers may be able to request field notes or other
evidence such as statistical data from investigators that led to DOJCRD findings. Armed
with that data, if available, researchers can then make an independent analysis and
conclude with proper presentation of the findings.
Future researchers may also want to consider potential biases within the DOJCRD
itself and how this changes with each Administration. The DOJCRD lists no specific
criteria for decisions to move forward with a formal investigation. They conduct a
preliminary inquiry and decide if a full investigation is warranted. I could not find any
specific triggering point to move forward with a formal investigation when I reviewed
their findings. The data from this study also suggests a correlation with changes in
Presidential administrations. If the finding holds true, this opens the door for the
possibility of bias within the Department of Justice that may ebb and flow with the
underlying ideologies of the current administration. As stated earlier, allegations of
selective bias on the part of local law enforcement agencies are in findings reports of the
DOJCRD investigations. This allegation may also hold true for the DOJCRD itself.
Finally, future researchers may want to consider the overall monetary costs and
outcome of these investigations when conducted by the DOJCRD. A comparison can be
made with results from state and local investigative teams. The costs associated with
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DOJCRD investigations are enormous. As stated in the literature review, The
Washington Post (2015) found the Los Angeles Police Department, DOJCRD reform
agreement cost taxpayers an estimated $300 million. The investigation alone took the
DOJCRD four years to complete. At the same time, Mayor Tom Bradley convened an
investigation by the Special Independent Commission better known as the Christopher
Commission who found the same results within 4 months (Independent Commission on
the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991).
Conclusion
To say I was disappointed with the data from the UCR is an understatement.
Because the UCR is used both nationally and internationally in so many ways, the
Department of Justice should put more emphasis into this program. There is a far greater
purpose for UCR statistics than there is for the DOJCRD.
The results of this study unveiled the negative consequences of DOJCRD
investigations adding to the questions of the efficacy of this organization. When
combined with the cost associated with this enormous bureaucracy, perhaps it’s time for
Congress to re-examine 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The data indicates these investigations are
only getting worse for communities and law enforcement agencies.
The need for police to work within the confines of the U.S. Constitution cannot be
overstated. Rushin and Edwards (2017) argue that increased crime is the cost of
Constitutional policing and that more money should be allocated to the DOJCRD for
their work. I don’t agree. There are many avenues available to citizens if their
Constitutional rights are violated by anyone, including law enforcement. If indeed a law
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enforcement agency is exhibiting patterns and practices of Constitutional and civil rights
violations on its citizens, state agencies have the power to target and investigate local law
enforcement agencies. In the past, this was done at comparatively minuscule costs and in
considerably less time.
Congress turned down the Department of Justice request four times before they
finally granted this power to the DOJCRD through the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act. As stated earlier, not always do politicians get it right. The DOJCRD is
a massive federal bureaucracy that is negatively impacting law enforcement agencies and
the communities they serve. Congress should repeal this decision.

82
References
Alpert, G. P., McLean, K., & Wolfe, S. (2017). Consent decrees: An approach to police
accountability and reform. Police Quarterly, 20(3), 239-249. Retrieved from
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1098611117709591
Babbie, E. (2017). The basics of social research (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage
Learning.
Beyers, C. (2017, April 20). St Louis police chief out on new mayor’s first full day. St
Louis Post-Dispatch. Retrieved from http://www.stltoday.com/news/ local/crimeand-courts/st-louis-police-chief-out-on-new-mayor-s-first/ article_368d46a7616a-5bf7-9571-e4ef111ac24c.html
Bidgood, J. (2016, January 15). The numbers behind Baltimore’s record year in
homicides. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/01/14/us/Baltimore-homicides-record.html
Blau, R. (2016, December 27). Former Chicago top cop blames city’s spike in violence
on politicians’ interference with police business. New York Daily News. Retrieved
from http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ ex-chicago-top-blames-cityspike-violence-politicians-article-1.2925908
Bratton, W.J., and Malinowski, S.W. (2008). Police performance management in
practice: Taking COMPSTAT to the next level. Policing: A Journal of Policy and
Practice, 2(3), 259-265. doi:10.1093/police/pan036
Bronstein, N. (2014). Police management and quotas: Governance in the comp stat era.
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 48(4), 543-581.

83
Budget Staff Justice Management Division. (1999). 2000 budget summary. Retrieved
from https://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/2k-summary/2kbudget.pdf
Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. (1963). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs
for research. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Cantora, A., Iyer, S., & Restivo, L. (2016). Understanding drivers of crime in East
Baltimore: Resident perceptions of why crime persists. Am J Crim Just, 41, 686709. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-015-9314-6
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. (1983). Oyez. Retrieved from
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1064
Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice. (2017, January). The Civil Rights
Division’s Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994-Present. Retrieved
from https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download
Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse. (n.d.). DOJ Investigation of Torrance Police
Department. Retrieved from the University of Michigan Law School website:
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15217&search=source%7Cgeneral
%3BcaseName%7Ctorrance%20police%20department%3Borderby%7CfilingYea
r%3B
Clarke, R. V. G. (1980). “Situational” crime prevention: Theory and practice. British
Journal of Criminology, 20,136-147.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.bjc.a047153
Clarke, R. V. (2012). Opportunity makes the thief, really? Crime Science, 1(1), 1-9.
https://doi.org/.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1186/2193-7680-1-3

84
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine
activities approach. American Sociological Review, 44, 588-608.
Consent decree (2008). In West’s Encyclopedia of American Law (2 ed.). Retrieved from
http://legal- dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/consent+decree
Department of Justice. (n.d.). Agreement in Principle Between the United States and the
City of Baltimore Regarding the Baltimore City Police Department. Government
Printing Office.
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. (2000, May 8). LAPD notice of
investigation letter. Retrieved October 26, 2017, from The United States
Department of Justice website: https://www.justice.gov/crt/lapd-noticeinvestigation-letter
Department of Justice, FBI. (2015). Missouri offenses known to law enforcement, 2015
[Table]. Retrieved from FBI: UCR database.
Department of Justice, FBI. (2016, September). Latest crime statistics released, increase
in violent crime, decrease in property crime. Retrieved from FBI website:
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/latest-crime-statistics-released
Department of Justice, FBI. (2017, January 9). Preliminary crime stats for 2016 released
[Infographic]. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/preliminarycrime-stats-for-2016-released
Department of Justice, FBI. (2017, January 26). Crime reported by Chicago Police
Department, Illinois [Table]. Retrieved from
https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Local/RunCrimeJurisbyJuris.cfm

85
Desmond, M., Papachristos, A. V., & Kirk, D. S. (2016). Police violence and citizen
crime reporting in the black community. American Sociological Review, 81(5),
857-876. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416663494
Dewan, S. (2017, March 29). Deconstructing the Ferguson effect. The New York Times.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/us/politics/fergusoneffect.html
FBI. (2017, September 25). FBI releases 2016 report on crime in the United States.
Retrieved from The United States Department of Justice website:
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fbi-releases-2016-report-crime-united-states
FBI. (2017, May). A word about UCR data. Retrieved from https://ucr.fbi.gov/a-wordabout-ucr-data
FBI. (n.d.). What we investigate. Retrieved from FBI website:
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/federal-civil-rights-statutes
Frontline’s Enterprise Journalism Group. (n.d.). Fixing the force. Retrieved from
Frontline website: http://apps.frontline.org/fixingtheforce/#year/1995
Gramlich, J. (2018, January 30). 5 facts about crime in the U.S. Retrieved from Pew
Research Center website: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/30/5facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/
Haake, K. (2014, July 22). Missoula county attorney get national award for stand against
DOJ investigation. Billings Gazette. Retrieved from
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/missoula-countyattorney-gets-national-award-for-stand-against-doj/article_5f18c7e0-3889-518a-

86
b63b-f8eb8ce7229f.html
Hollis, M. E., Felson, M., & Welsh, B. C. (2013). The capable guardian in routine
activities theory: A theoretical and conceptual reappraisal. Crime Prevention and
Community Safety, 15(1), 65-79.
http://dx.doi.org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1057/cpcs.2012.14
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights (1991).
Police Brutality. Retrieved from
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000020346911;view=1up;seq=7
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department. (1991). Report of the
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department. Retrieved from
https://archive.org/details/ChristopherCommissionLAPD
Kaste, M. (2014, March 12). Missoula county attorney tells justice department it’s wrong.
NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2014/03/12/289299065/missoulacounty-attorney-tells-justice-department-its-wrong
Kelly, K., Childress, S., & Rich, S. (2015, November 13). Forced reforms, mixed results.
The Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/11/13/forced-reformsmixed- results/?utm_term=.c08f01cd65df
Los Angeles Police Dept., 1996. In the Course of Change: The Los Angeles Police
Department Five Years After the Christopher Commission.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=174032
Legal Information Institute. (n.d.). Consent decree. In Nolo’s plain-English law

87
dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/consent_decree
Maxfield, M. G., & Babbie, E. R. (2011). Research methods for criminal justice and
criminology (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Moore, M.H. (2003). Sizing up COMPSTAT: An important administrative innovation in
policing. Criminology and Public Policy, 2(3), 469-494. doi:10.1111/ j.17459133.2003.tb00009.x.
Moore, M.H. & Braga, A.A. (2003). Measuring and improving police performance: The
lessons of CompStat and its progeny. Policing: An International Journal of Police
Strategies and Management, 26(3), 439-453.
National Institute of Justice. (2009, October 14). Why crimes occur in hot spots.
Retrieved June 24, 2017, from Office of Justice Program website:
https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/strategies/hot-spot-policing/Pages/
why-hot-spots-occur.aspx#routineactivity
Nix, J., & Wolfe, S. E. (2016). Sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect: The role of managerial
organizational justice. Journal of Criminal Justice, 47, 12-20.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2016.06.002
Peters, M. (n.d.). U Chicago Crime Lab releases 2016 gun violence report. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago. http://news.uchicago.edu/story/uchicago-crime-labreleases-2016-gun-violence-report
Pyrooz, D. C., Decker, S. H., Wolfe, S. E., & Shjarback, J. A. (2016). Was there a
Ferguson Effect on crime rates in large U.S. Cities? Journal of Criminal Justice,
46, 1-8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2016.01.001

88
Rosenfeld, R. (2016, June). Documenting and explaining the 2015 homicide rise:
Research directions (Report No. NCJ 249895). Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice.
Rushin, S. (2014). Federal enforcement of police reform. Fordham Law Review, 82(6),
3189-3247. Retrieved from http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol82/iss6/20
Rushin, S., & Edwards, G. (2017). De-Policing. Cornell Law Review, 2(3), 721-782.
Retrieved from http://cornelllawreview.org/articles/de-policing/
Sabbatini, R. M.E. (1997, March). Cesare Lombroso: A brief biography. Retrieved
February 10, 2017, from Phrenology, the History of Brain Localization website:
http://www.cerebromente.org.br/n01/frenolog/lombroso.htm
Shjarback, J., Decker, S., Wolfe, S., & Pyrooz, D. (2017, September 18). Did the
Ferguson shooting make police less proactive? The Washington Post, Opinions.
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/did-the-fergusonshooting-make-police-less-proactive/2017/09/18/a5ac91f2-76fb-11e7-8839ec48ec4cae25_story.html?utm_term=.bcc0a30ee9fc
Stone, C., Foglesong, T., & Cole, C. M. (2009, May). Policing Los Angeles under a
consent decree: The dynamics of change at the LAPD. Retrieved September 18,
2017, from Harvard Kennedy School Program in Criminal Justice Policy and
Management website: http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/HarvardLAPD%20Study.pdf
The Disaster Center. (2016). Pennsylvania crime rates 1960-2015. Retrieved September
20, 2017, from http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/pacrime.htm

89
United States of America v. Police Department of Baltimore, No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2017). Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925056/download
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Right Division. (2015, March). Investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department. US Dept. of Justice.
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. (2016, August). Investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Department. Department of Justice.
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, & United States Attorney’s Office
Northern District of Illinois. (2017, January). Investigation of the Chicago Police
Department. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download
United States of America v. The City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-CV-000180-CDP (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 17, 2016). https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/833701/download
United States v. City of Philadelphia, 187 F.2d (Dec. 29, 1980)
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S.D., McNally, A., Greenspan, R., and Willis, J.J. (2003).
Reforming to preserve: COMPSTAT and strategic problem solving in American
policing. Criminology and Public Policy, 2(3), 421-456.
Willis, J. J. (2011). First-line supervision and strategic decision making under compstat
and community policing. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 24(2), 235-256.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403411427355
Winter, J. (2013). Using the student’s t-test with extremely small sample sizes. Practical
Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 18(10), 1-12. Retrieved from
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=18&n=10

90
Wolfe, S. E., & Nix, J. (2016). The alleged “Ferguson Effect” and police willingness to
engage in community partnership. Law and Human Behavior, 40(1), 1-10.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000164
Wortley, R. (2001). A classification of techniques for controlling situational precipitators
of crime. Security Journal, 14(4), 63-82.
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.sj.8340098
Yan, H. (2015, August 4). Former Ferguson cop Darren Wilson opens up about his life in
seclusion. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/04/us/darrenwilson-new-yorker-interview/index.html

91
Appendix A: Crime and Arrest Rates with Trendlines
Trendlines are 3 years before and 3 years after the commencement of a
department of justice investigation (arrest data were not available in some cities).
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(Baltimore and Chicago are limited to two years because 2017 data is currently
unavailable.)

